Enabling Economic Growth by Olsson, Per
   
   
   
 
 
 
   
Department of Economics   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enabling Economic Growth 
Energy Utilization and the Engines of Economic Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEKK01 
Spring-09 
Instructor: Pontus Hansson  Author: Per Olsson 
 
  
Abstract 
In this thesis I argue that the absence of energy utilization as a component in 
contemporary economic history and economic growth theory severely limits our 
understanding of economic development as a process. Although energy is not 
sufficient to explain the unprecedented expansion in the world economy since the 
industrial revolution, it is however absolutely necessary. 
Technological progress remains the direct cause of economic growth in the 
long run, but innovativeness must be facilitated by economically beneficial 
institutions. There is a broad consensus about institutions as the engine behind 
long term growth. My intention is not to challenge that notion, but I want to stress 
that pinpointing those exact benign institutions has proven to be very difficult. 
And even when we accept institutions as central to economic growth, one 
question remains: What has caused the differences in institutional outcomes 
across the globe? It has been widely suggested that competition is the key to 
institutional development, but I will argue that a purely quantitative outlook on 
competition does not explain institutional outcomes. Instead I suggest a more 
qualitative approach in the concept of contextual dynamism. 
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1 Introduction 
Energy is vital, but often overlooked, as a component in to economic growth. 
Although the direct cause of economic growth is productivity enhancing 
innovations, these must in turn be facilitated by benign institutional arrangements. 
Energy however plays a central role in the economy. It can be utilized in an 
enormous variety of ways; nutrition, heating and to produce a vast array of goods. 
In this thesis I hope to specify the relationship between economic development 
and energy utilization. I also wish to contribute to contemporary institutional 
theory by discussing the causes of differences in institutional arrangements. 
We humans spent most of our existence as nomads. Twelve millennia ago 
humans started to cultivate the land, prompting a slow but steady expansion of 
population and production. Muscle power of man and beast, but also wind and 
water power, provided the energy inputs into production. 
During the last two centuries, as fossil energy resources were introduced in the 
world economy, both population and production have virtually exploded. World 
population has increased six-fold since 1820, income per head nearly ten-fold, and 
consequently world production grew sixty-fold (Maddison 2007, p. 69). However, 
this wealth has been very unevenly distributed among the world’s inhabitants. 
Modern economic history and growth theory stress the importance of 
institutions for economic development. The economy expands with technological 
progress. But this progress, in turn, has to be facilitated by institutions beneficial 
for innovativeness. Despite this, surprisingly little has been said about the causes 
of differences in institutional settings. This gap needs to be filled if we are to fully 
understand long term economic development. 
This thesis is part of a larger, personal and ongoing, project called Genesis of 
Economy. It results from a frustration with an inadequacy of contemporary 
economic history and modern economic growth theory to explain what caused and 
enabled the industrial revolution and the subsequent exponential growth. 
1.1 Questions and Results 
It is widely accepted that the unprecedented growth following the industrial 
revolution is somehow linked to the discovery of fossil energy resources. 
Similarly, as we shall see, there is a strong connection between energy 
consumption and income levels among contemporary nations. However, ascribing 
any direct causality to energy utilization is not supported by empirics. But if this 
is not the case, the question asked must be: What is the exact relationship between 
energy utilization and economic growth? 
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Much has been written on the topic, but a coherent hypothesis regarding this 
relationship has not yet been formulated. In my view this limits our understanding 
of industrialization and economic growth as a process. 
In Chapter 2, I aim to specify the relationship between utilization of energy 
resources and economic growth. I found that utilization of a new set of energy 
resources, i.e. fossil fuels, is not sufficient to explain the industrial revolution or 
the following demographic and economic growth. However, it is absolutely 
necessary. Furthermore, I argue that it is not energy utilization per se, but our 
ability to utilize that energy that causes growth. But this hypothesis just prompts 
the question: What determines our ability to utilize energy resources? 
The “ability to utilize that energy” is merely a reformulation, though I will 
argue; an important one, of technological progress as a concept. And hence, many 
answers have already been suggested within the contemporary fields of economic 
growth and economic history. 
In Chapter 3, I present and scrutinize suggested answers by the geographic 
schools and the institutional ditto. There is a consensus that the technological 
progress which drives growth has to be facilitated by progressive institutions. But 
exactly what institutions that have been most important for facilitating 
innovativeness and growth, is more widely debated. There is some consensus 
around the importance of property rights and free market, but I will show that 
even these arguments can not be accepted without complications. 
One major question that goes unanswered within economic history is: If 
different institutions ultimately cause different growth paths, what then causes 
different institutional settings? Why did Western Europe foster the institutions 
that led her to industrialization, while others did not? A wide array of authors has, 
specifically or implicitly, identified competing nation states and competition as 
the determinant of economically benign institutional settings. But I will argue that 
this purely quantitative approach to competition is insufficient as explanation and 
needs to be complemented by a more qualitative approach. 
In Chapter 4, I examine the competition argument and give it a qualitative 
dimension through the concept of contextual dynamism. I find the notion of a 
competing and competitive Western Europe against a non-competing and 
uncompetitive surrounding world to be flawed and insufficient. Instead the nature 
of the specific competition facing each region determines the specific set of 
institutions. I call this approach to competition contextual dynamism. 
1.2 Theory and Previous Studies 
This thesis aims to complement existing theories. More specifically, I hope to 
complement modern growth theory with a new outlook on the importance of 
energy utilization. Furthermore I wish to continue the debate within the field of 
economic history about the role of institutions and competition. Consequently the 
thesis has to rest solidly on work from both these fields. And any hypothesis 
rendered here, must also be scrutinized and subjected to counter arguments. 
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The causes of economic growth and prosperity have interested people since 
antiquity, at least. Intellectuals of that time stressed that the virtue of the right 
religion or ethnicity, i.e. their own, would determine material outcomes (e.g. 
Landes 1998). In Europe these thoughts dominated throughout the Middle Ages. 
The early mercantilists of the 16th century stressed importance of bullion 
accumulation through controlled trade. The later mercantilists put more emphasis 
on the stimulation and protection of employment and production within high 
value sectors (Magnusson 1999). This would secure national wealth and power. 
By contrast Adam Smith, in his Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations, argued that 
free trade and the consequent specialization would create benefits for all nations 
involved (Mokyr 1990, p. 5). David Ricardo followed with his theory on 
comparative advantages, which had similar implications. Trade and specialization 
however facilitates only one form of economic growth. Later generations would 
focus more on investment and technology driven development. 
Modern economic growth theory can be said to originate from the publication 
of the seminal paper A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth by Robert 
Solow (Jones 2002, p. 20). The Solow model demonstrates how capital is 
accumulated through investment. Countries with high investment rates tend to 
have higher income, but capital accumulation can not alone explain long term 
economic growth (ibid., p. 33-36). Due to this fact Solow introduced technology, 
exogenous in his model, as the determinant of long term growth (ibid., p. 36-39). 
No major attempt was made to define technological progress within an 
economic model until Paul Romer and Robert Lucas incorporated findings on 
how imperfect competition affects the incentive structure from the field of 
microeconomics (ibid., p. 2). Romer, in his endogenous growth model identifies 
the importance of research and development conducted by profit seeking actors in 
the economy (ibid., p. 96-97). 
These thoughts also resound within economic history. For instance, Joel 
Mokyr (1990), in his Levers of Riches, highlights the importance of innovations. 
But it is not the innovations that are at the heart of his argumentation though, but 
innovativeness. He sees creativity and the incentives for it, as the driving force 
behind the industrialization in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th century. 
This institutional approach to growth was fathered by Douglass North. He sees 
the rise of property rights as crucial to the European development, as it created 
incentives for investment and innovation (e.g. North & Thomas 1973). He also 
sees a competitive market economy as something uniquely European and that this 
competition was the main cause of its innovativeness (North 1993). It is also 
widely accepted within growth theory that institutional arrangements are central to 
any country’s economic performance (Jones 2002, p. 143). 
What about the role of energy in modern growth theory? Energy is almost 
totally neglected as a growth component. Energy resources are only included as a 
subtraction on the growth rate, as finite resources becomes increasingly scarce 
(ibid., p. 173-175). I agree with Shahid Alam (2009) that this does not capture the 
role of energy in the world economy, nor by any mean the environmental costs of 
their use. And this severely limits our understanding of industrialization and 
economic growth. 
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What has been written about the relationship between economic development 
and energy within economic history? Vaclav Smil’s (1994) Energy in World 
History is perhaps the most comprehensive piece of literature on this subject. It is 
descriptive in nature, and although the work highlights the link between energy 
and economic development, he refutes any claims of causality, instead ascribing 
innovations and institutions as the true engines of growth. 
1.3 Methods and Delimitations 
Methodologically my thesis has little in common with the works of economic 
growth theorists like Solow and Romer, who use advanced algebra to formulate 
coherent growth models. Neither do I, within the scope of this thesis at least, 
make use of growth accounting, as does Nicholas Crafts (2004) in his evaluation 
of the role of steam in 19th century Britain. Methodologically this thesis draws 
more inspiration from Vaclav Smil (1994) or Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), who uses 
sets of data to support their argumentation. 
I have also drawn on the combined effort of Douglas Hibbs, Ola Olsson and 
Jared Diamond (2004), who uses econometric analysis to argue for the importance 
of bio-geographical endowments to the differences in contemporary levels of 
national income. 
I incorporate economic growth theory in this thesis, not so much as a method 
of analysis, but as a conceptual rally point, to which I connect lines of thought. 
This thesis also has minor influxes of trade theory and micro analysis. For 
instance, I make use of findings on the connection between imperfect competition 
and research and development from microeconomics. 
The main method of analysis is to support my argumentation with data, 
presented in tables throughout the thesis. In regards to econometrics I have used 
the ordinary least squares method to support claims of correlation between 
variables of interest. As a guide to econometric analysis I have used the 
introductory book Essentials of Econometrics by Damodar Gujarati (2005).  
In order to shed light on the relationship between economic development and 
energy consumption the following econometric model was specified:  
 
lngni = c(1) + c(2) * lnenergy 
 
Here lngni represents the logarithm of Gross National Income per capita and 
lnenergy the logarithm of energy consumption in kg of oil equivalent per capita, 
both sets of data retrieved from the World Bank web page (www.worldbank.org). 
Because of the exponential nature of both income development and energy 
consumption over time I have estimated the logarithm of these variables. 
In Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis I use a methodology more akin to social 
sciences, e.g. economic history. Still I draw support from empirics, but less so on 
economic statistics, due to lack of data on the topics discussed. 
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When studying world economic development one can only hope to include a 
small fraction of the subject at hand. There is nothing regrettable about that, since 
a complete narrative would have been both impossible to produce and read. 
But two of these delimitations may make the explanations given here a bit 
simplistic, namely; class and gender. Changing class structures can impact 
institutional arrangements and thereby the economic growth process. And 
women’s participation in the labour market has had an immense effect on modern 
economic growth, development and social life. Environment is part of the thesis, 
but is treated only ad hoc. This is regrettable as our environment is central to the 
possibilities of sustained growth, but was necessitated by the limited time frame. 
1.4 Material and Data  
I have relied heavily on secondary sources, literature consisting of books and 
articles from the fields of economic growth theory and economic history. In order 
to form a comprehensive view of modern economic growth theory I have turned 
to Charles Jones (2002). For a critical examination of the role of institutions I 
have been aided by Dani Rodrik (2003). And as growth theory is intertwined with 
the field of economic history, I have made use of work from leading authors 
within that field, e.g. Jared Diamond (1997), Joel Mokyr (1990), Douglass North 
(1973), David Landes (1998), Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), in order to capture the 
contemporary debate. Some of my data also comes from these secondary sources, 
but most come from more specific sources of macro data. 
For historical data on levels and growth of GDP per capita and population, I 
have relied on Angus Maddison (2001). Though many of his findings deserve to 
be scrutinized, my time frame did not allow such an enterprise. But some of my 
critique can be seen in Section 3.2. and Appendix 2. 
Data collection has been exclusively quantitative. GDP per capita data was 
collected from the Penn World Tables, 6.2 (pwt.econ.upenn.edu). Statistics on 
GNI per capita, in current international $, and energy consumption from 2006 was 
retrieved from the World Bank web page (www.worldbank.org). This was 
complemented by data on urbanization, also from the latter source, and GDP per 
capita from the CIA World Fact Book (www.cia.gov). I have also used data on the 
composition on energy consumption for individual countries from publications by 
the Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov). All data included in 
the model specified in Section 1.3 has then been processed through E-views. 
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2 Energy and Economic Growth 
In this chapter I seek to specify the exact relationship between energy utilization 
and economic development. First, in section 2.1, I briefly outline the role of 
energy in the pre-industrial era. Here added energy, almost exclusively in the form 
of agricultural output, with time translated into an increase in population and only 
modest gains in living standard. This phenomenon was first formulated by 
Thomas Malthus, but also ceased to be true with the industrial revolution. 
In section 2.2, I discuss the relationship between energy utilization, i.e. fossil 
fuels and the industrial revolution, together with the economic and demographic 
expansion that followed. Here I suggest that fossil fuel was necessary, but not 
sufficient for industrial growth. Yet, it is this necessity that highlights both its 
importance in the past as well as the contemporary challenges we face with 
regarding sustainable development and environmental degradation. 
Finally, in section 2.3, I link my findings to the contemporary debate within 
the fields of growth theory and economic history concerning the importance of 
innovations and institutions as the engines of growth. I do this by a redefinition of 
technological development, arguing that there are merits to doing so, as it helps us 
to add a qualitative dimension to technological innovation. 
2.1 Energy in History 
Energy can take many forms; be transformed, and wasted, but never destroyed. 
Humans started separating from other apes about seven million years ago, but 
energy utilization did not differ much between them. During most of these seven 
million years early humans lived as hunters and gatherers. Nutrition, the 
consumption, gave energy that was spent on the acquisition, the production, of the 
very same. Nutritional intake equalled energy consumption up until about 250,000 
years ago, when fire was first domesticated (Smil 1994, p. 17). These early 
humans had the intelligence to successfully make tools and fend of predators, then 
spread across the globe. Their spread was slow, but accelerating, and by 10,000 
BCE all the world’s continents were inhabited (Diamond 1997, p. 37-39).  
The sustainability of this lifestyle varied across time and space. Largely 
sustaining, or forced to sustain, a delicate balance with nature these early humans 
however left an enormous ecological footprint in the Americas. When first 
appearing there their hunting skills were considerable, but the large mammals 
were totally unaware of the danger. As an effect, the so called Clovis culture 
wiped out the entire mega fauna of the twin continents. This would have an 
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immense adverse effect on the biological, ecologic and thereby and economic 
conditions of later Native American cultures. (ibid., p. 49-51, 212-214)  
Why did humans eventually start cultivating? Especially considering that 
energy returns per working hour was probably lower, at least initially? The most 
reasonable explanation is that the population expansion and climate change had 
brought about diminishing returns to hunting and foraging (Smil 1994, p. 22-24). 
Also cultivation was a far more secure source of nutrition. Even if it demanded 
longer working hours, it supplied some measure of rudimentary food security. 
Domestication of flora and fauna created a whole new energy system. Grains 
provided a stabile source of nutrition with high energy content. Domesticated 
animals not only provided meat and dairy products, but some also provided 
kinetic energy to the agricultural production (ibid., p. 40-49). Horses, oxen and 
mules in most of Eurasia, water buffalo in East Asia, all aided their masters in 
production and transportation; horses even became decisive in warfare. 
Population growth was rapid compared to hunting and gathering societies, but 
slow compared to modern. Economic growth in the agricultural societies was slow 
and uneven through time. The upward trend was modest, see Section 2.2, largely 
due to the fact that the creation and diffusion of innovations were relatively slow. 
This is not to say that the innovations were not impressive. New or improved 
farming tools increased the yield from the muscle power of man and beast; like 
scythes, ploughs and harnesses (Mokyr 1990). Another form of innovation was 
the introduction of new crops. Like the crop exchange between the New and Old 
World, such as potato to Europe and wheat to the Americas, but also the high 
yielding Champa rice introduced in China during the Song dynasty. Animal 
husbandry, breeding stronger horses and oxen, was also to become an important 
mean of improving yields, particularly in Western Europe (Smil 1994). 
Yet other agricultural innovations were organizational in nature. European 
agricultural output grew significantly due to the enclosure movement in the 18th 
century. And let us not forget the acquisition of new land, either by clearing 
forests, draining marshlands or conquering it from the sea, processes important in 
every densely populated region. Another important set of improvements available 
to agricultural societies was to intensify irrigation and fertilization, methods most 
developed in East Asia, i.e. China and Japan (Maddison 1998, Pomeranz 2000). 
Then what about non-animal kinetic energy in pre-industrial manufacturing? 
Water and wind was harnessed with the introduction of mills, first used to process 
grain, but later also in textile and iron production. These mills were most common 
in Western Europe, particularly water mills in England (Mokyr 1990, p. 34-35). 
Water mills would continue to be important in Western European production even 
throughout the industrial revolution (ibid., p. 90-91). 
Even though this thesis implies that thermal energy from fossil fuels became 
pivotal with the industrial revolution, it is still of interest to know: What effect did 
fossil fuel consumption have on the performance on pre-industrial economies? 
The answer does not come easy. When used as domestic heating, always as a 
minor source, any assessments are difficult to make. When used in metallurgy, 
glass and porcelain industry, one could imagine a cost-benefit analysis, but this 
would only produce sector wide results not national. 
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However we are not left entirely empty handed, for instance Jan Luiten van 
Zanden (1993) has asked whether or not the Golden Age in the Netherlands can 
be explained by the use of peat. He finds that energy consumption co-varies with 
GDP, but does not find any such connection to energy intensity. If the relative 
price of peat had fallen during this era it would stimulate energy intense 
production and thereby contribute to growth. But the price of peat relative to other 
goods actually climbed during the entire period (ibid., p. 275-276). van Zanden 
does however find that the low relative price of coal contributed the rise of energy 
intense production and thereby to the industrialization of the Netherlands (ibid., p. 
276-277). A demand driven analysis might have yielded different results 
concerning the Golden Age. It may be that relative prices were pushed upward 
due to high demand during the 17th century? 
But this is unsupported speculation on my part and of no major concern to this 
thesis. More so are van Zanden’s findings on falling relative prices on coal and its 
contribution to industrialization, a more straightforward supply driven process, 
not very different from any other European nation at that time. His main point is 
that energy intensity does not explain variations in pre-industrial economy; neither 
would we expect it to. Studies of other nations would probably yield the same 
results. Keep in mind however that the cited study focuses on energy intensity, not 
energy utilization, and its links to economic growth. And van Zanden does show 
that in the long run energy consumption co-varied with production. 
From the study of pre-industrial societies we can also conclude that although 
energy consumption to a certain extent co-varies with economic development. 
Shifts in energy systems did not bring about a new growth trajectory. And neither 
did the mere use of fossil energy resources. The English used coal in glass 
making, brewing and metallurgy in the 16th century (Landes 1998, p. 227). The 
Chinese used coal in steel making during the Song and natural gas in salt 
extraction (Smil 1994, p. 159, 167). The fact remains that in pre-industrial times 
all innovations, energy or non-energy based, had a limited effect on long term 
living standards. Technological improvement that increased output translated, 
almost exclusively, into population growth. According to the logic of Malthus this 
would eventually lead to diminishing returns, but the industrial revolution brought 
with it both unprecedented population and economic growth. 
2.2 Energy Enables 
In this section I show that the introduction of fossil fuels was necessary for the 
unprecedented economic, and to a certain extent demographic, growth in world 
economy ever since the industrial revolution in the 19th century. 
In 2.2.1, I demonstrate that fossil fuels did not impact the population 
expansion during pre-industrial times or during the industrial revolution. But the 
unprecedented expansion during the last century would have been hard to imagine 
without fossil fuels. In 2.2.2, I argue that the relationship between energy and 
economic growth is that the former enables the latter, and that it is only because of 
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fossil fuels that industrialization was made possible. Finally I summarize my 
findings in 2.2.3 and comment on the implications. 
2.2.1 Population growth 
Historically population expansion has increased along with the steady 
improvements in the agricultural sector. However both innovation and diffusion 
of best practice was fairly slow, as we have seen in section 2.1, at least prior to the 
18th century (Smil 1994). Population growth faced some major interruption, like 
the 13th and 14th centuries when Asia and Europe faced the onslaught of the 
bubonic plague, and the 16th century Americas when its native population was 
brought to near extinction by smallpox and colonial rule (Diamond 1997, p. 197-
199). Nonetheless world population grew along a steadily upward trend, from 268 
million in 1000 CE to 603 million by 1700 CE (Maddison 2001, Table B-10, p. 
241). This was due to innovations in agriculture such as; improved equipment, 
incorporation of foreign crops, creating farmland by draining marshland, fending 
of the sea, or improving existing farmland by increased irrigation and fertilization. 
Every such improvement left room for ever denser populations. 
 
Table 1: Population in Chosen Regions and World Total (000) 
Region/Year 1500 1700 1820 1913 1998 
China 103,000 138,000 381,000 437,140 1,242,000 
India 110,000 165,000 209,000 303,700 975,000 
Japan 15,400 27,000 31,000 51,672 126,469 
W. Europe 57,268 81,460 132,888 261,007 388,399 
UK 3,942 8,565 21,226 45,649 59,237 
USA 2,000 1,000 9,981 40,241 270,561 
World 437,818 603,410 1,041,092 1,1791,020 5,907,680 
Source: Maddison 2001, Appendix B, p. 241, Table B-10 
 
All these innovations helped humans get more energy out of the same amount 
of land or, put differently, more out of the photosynthesis. Yet, we should not 
jump to any overtly deterministic conclusion. For instance, it is difficult to ascribe 
the population expansion in the 18th century to a shift in energy extracting 
technology. Any good historian would tell that the population expansion began, 
although at a more modest pace, long before the start of the fossil fuel era. The 
population expansion during the industrial revolution is better explained by 
innovations and institutional improvements rather than fossil energy inputs. 
Today there is no direct connection between population size and energy 
consumption per capita. Why should there be? Population expansion is not 
dependent on overall energy consumption, but rather linked to a single form of 
energy, i.e. nutrition. By the logic of Malthus any increase in output, agricultural 
output, eventually leads to an increase in population, leaving little or no room for 
growth in income per capita. But as we shall see in the following section this 
process was broken in the 19th century, as both population and income exploded. 
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From 1700 to 1820 Europe experienced a rapid expansion of population, see 
Table 1. This process, by some called the agricultural revolution, has been widely 
studied by scholars and seen as a prelude to the industrial revolution. This would 
support Ester Boserup’s claims; that population expansion can trigger innovation 
by pure necessity. This expansion has been largely attributed to the enclosure 
movement (Schön 2000, p. 43-44), and further output increase to diffusion of 
New World crops, especially potatoes, in the 19th century (ibid., p. 71).  
And right before the industrial revolution there actually were some major 
improvements in agriculture; the enclosure movement, abolishing the commons, 
reserved land for pasture, drainage of wetlands, widespread use of mineral 
fertilizers and improvements in traditional equipment. New fertilizers came from 
collected guano or a chemical variety from mineral phosphates (Mokyr 1990, p. 
120-121). Major improvements from the mid-19th century in medicine and 
hygiene have also been stressed as causing falling mortality rates. But some have 
noted that falling death rates began before the economic and medical innovations 
could have paid off, instead citing a decrease in the virulence among parasites 
(ibid., p. 54-55). These innovations and institutional improvements were specific 
to Europe, but not necessary for massive population growth. 
Note that Europe was not alone in this population expansion. During the 
period 1700-1820, mostly under the reign of the Qianlong emperor, 1735-1796, 
(Smil 1994, p. 63), Chinese population grew dramatically, even more rapid than 
the European, see Table 1. It was even more dramatic still when looking at the 
official censuses, which leading researchers in the field have for some reason 
ignored (Deng 2003). This expansion however had no direct connection to any 
major shift in energy utilization (Smil 1994, p. 253). There was no rapid increase 
in fossil fuels and the New World crops had been introduced in China during the 
Ming dynasty. But then, why do we not see an expansion during the Ming? 
My own thought on the Qianlong-expansion goes in two directions. The 
corruption and civil unrest of the late Ming may have led to miscalculations by 
officials and reluctance to perform adequate censuses. Or if the censuses are 
correct; the expansion can partly be explained by the lag created by the 
mismanagement of infrastructure, so vital to the agricultural performance. The 
subsequent civil wars and Manchu invasion also played their part. The rapid 
expansion during the Manchu would then also be an effect of a lagging 
performance. Only with the Qing consolidation did the New World crops fulfil 
their potential, as Kent Deng notes (2003, p. 62). Another important feature is the 
territorial expansion that opened new lands and alleviated the crowded Chinese 
heartlands (ibid., p. 59-60). The Chinese experience also teaches us something 
else; that population expansion does not automatically lead to economic growth. 
The most astonishing population growth of the 19th century was experienced 
in the Americas. This was almost entirely due to the settlement, or resettlement, of 
the continents, especially the US. The migration was modest in the 18th century, 
but accelerated and climaxed during the 19th century (Cameron & Neal 2003, p. 
287). This can be explained by the enormous environmental slack and 
opportunities for profitable cultivation that was offered by the vast and fertile 
expanses of North America, and to a lesser extent the pampas of South America. 
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With the introduction of fossil fuels in the in 20th century agriculture, a whole new 
production possibility frontier was introduced. New inorganic fertilizers and 
agricultural machinery would increase yields per acre further than any one could 
have imagined just fifty years earlier. Fossil fuels, first by components in 
fertilizers and later by fuelling machines, became a substitute for labour. In 1850, 
60 per cent of the American work force was involved in agriculture, in 1975 that 
share had dropped to 2 per cent. Today synthetic nitrogen supply half of the 
nutrients used and half of the five-fold expansion in irrigation is due to diesel or 
electric pumps. (Smil 1994, p. 189-190) 
Current energy inputs in agriculture are enormous and almost entirely supplied 
by fossil fuels. The U.S. production of one kilogram of nitrogen fertilizer requires 
1.4 to 1.8 litres, amounting to a total of 15.3 billion litres, of diesel in energy 
equivalent. Moreover we also have to take into account diesel for machinery, 
transports, irrigation, packing and refrigeration in the entire retail chain. All in all 
each American consumes over 1.500 litres of oil equivalent (Pfeiffer 2003). 
However the U.S. is not unique; Chinese energy inputs amount to three times as 
much (Smil1994, p. 190). The production possibilities enabled by fossil fuels have 
prompted a wasteful management, ten kcal are required to produce just one kcal 
of food, this even excluding energy in cooking (Pfeiffer 2003). 
It is not only in industrialized nations that fossil fuels have had an impact on 
agricultural performance. The so called Green revolution started in Mexico, but it 
was in Asia that reaped the biggest benefits, this largely due to the high yielding 
rice and wheat varieties (Rosset 2000). The big difference between this new rice 
and pre-industrial improvements was that crops previously were found in nature 
and these grown in laboratories. Petrochemical fertilizers were also a central part 
of the Green revolution in Asia and diesel driven pumps enabled even more 
intense irrigation (Smil 1994 p. 190). From 1950 to 1984 world wide grain output 
has increased by 250 per cent and energy inputs by 50 to 100-fold (Pfeiffer 2003). 
 
What would have happened without fossil fuels in agriculture? Well, we would 
still have potatoes and other New World crops, as well as the medical 
advancements made during the 19th century. And not all synthetic fertilizers were 
fossil fuel dependent. Other important fertilizers like guano, or minerals, would of 
course still be available to the British in the 18th century. And although the Green 
revolution was immensely dependent on fossil fuels, innovations like the new 
high-yielding rice would of course be feasible even without them. 
Furthermore, agriculture was slow to mechanize, not until after the First 
World War did tractors come into wide use in the Western world, and the rest has 
only begun the mechanization process (Smil 1994, p. 189). So for most part of the 
19th century output in agriculture was largely independent of fossil fuels. But for 
how long could such a development continue? 
The world experienced falling mortality rates and increasing population during 
the 19th century. So it is highly likely that the pre-industrial societies might have 
experienced some continued population expansion, especially those with some 
environmental slack, i.e. the Americas and to a lesser extent Europe, India and 
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Africa. But this process could not have continued indefinitely. Were it not for the 
mechanization and new fuel inputs in the 20th century, agriculture would have run 
into diminishing returns. One exercise of thought: If we were to substitute all 
current tractors in the US for horses, 300 million hectares would be needed to feed 
the animals, twice the arable land (ibid., p. 246). According to another estimate; if 
fossil fuels were taken out of the picture it would take three weeks of work to 
cover one day of consumption (Pfeiffer 2003). 
Eventually the ecological barriers would have prompted diminishing returns, 
and what Fernand Braudel (1979) called the biological ancienne régime would 
have continued to rule. Without fossil fuels Malthus would have been victorious.  
Let us look at a society that did not make a shift in energy systems, China. 
Whether or not the Taiping rebellion was a result of population growth and falling 
per capita earnings or the falling legitimacy of the Manchu after the Opium war 
remains up for debate. But what can be said is that population expansion without 
any shift in energy supplies seems to have added significant stress to the Qing 
dynasty, which fell in 1912 due to internal and external pressure.  
2.2.2 Economic growth 
From the middle of the 19th century, and onward, per capita income in Western 
Europe and North America has grown exponentially, and others, particularly East 
Asian nations have later followed suit. This happened simultaneous with an 
exponential growth in energy consumption, the introduction and rapid growth in 
use of fossil fuels. In order to answer how economic and energy processes 
interacted, let us first take a look at the empirical evidence. 
 
Table 2: GDP per Capita in Chosen Regions and World Total 
(1990 international $) 
Region/Year 1500 1700 1820 1913 1998 
China 600 600 600 530 3117 
India 550 550 533 533 1746 
Japan 500 570 669 1387 20413 
W. Europe 774 1024 1232 3473 17921 
UK 714 1250 1707 4921 18714 
USA 400 527 1257 5301 27331 
World 444 615 667 1510 5709 
Source: Maddison 2001, Appendix B, p. 264, Table B-21 
 
Overall growth in the world economy was slow prior to the 19th century. The 
Netherlands had experienced some growth in the 17th century, due to their 
advances in trade rather than energy, growth that can be called Smithian in nature 
(Mokyr 1990, p. 5). Also Britain, as the first industrialized nation, seemed to have 
experienced some growth during the 18th century, see Table 2. But even on this 
pioneer island growth took off only from the mid- to late-19th century (Cameron 
& Neal 2003, p. 283). 
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This corresponds in time with the take-off of coal consumption (Crafts 2004, 
p. 342). Coal dominated the 19th century production and transportation and in the 
20th century it was substituted by superior crude oil inputs. As a comparison; in 
1850, biomass accounted for 80 per cent of all fuels, by 1970 that figure had 
dropped to 15 per cent (Alam 2009, p. 20). I will examine the role of coal in the 
British industrial experience in detail later. But before a historical analysis of 
causality, let us look at the contemporary world and how the two variables of 
energy and income correspond. 
Looking at the contemporary world there is solid, although complex evidence, 
that energy use and economic prosperity correlates. Historical data on the world 
as an entity is scarce. But from 1980 the world has witnessed a steady increase in 
both Gross National Income, GNI, per capita and energy use in oil equivalent per 
head. Table 3 shows that an increase in energy consumption explains 85.6 per 
cent of growth in income, and vice versa for that matter, from 1980 to 2006. 
 
Table 3: The World: Energy and Gross National Income 
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/23/09   Time: 16:08   
Sample: 1980 2006   
Included observations: 27   
LNGNI=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) -20.33588 2.361382 -8.611858 0.0000 
C(2) 3.918517 0.320285 12.23445 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.856883     Mean dependent var 8.552677 
Adjusted R-squared 0.851158     S.D. dependent var 0.339596 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.619285   
     
     
Source: World Bank (www.worldbank.org) 
 
Figure 1: Correlation: World Energy and GNI 
 
The model, specified in Chapter 
1, section 3, proves to be both 
economically and statistically 
significant. The same model has been 
used for the individual countries 
included, see Appendix 1. For the 
world however, it displays a problem 
with autocorrelation.  
Autocorrelation implies that the 
model is still unbiased, but not the 
most efficient model (Gujarati 2005). 
As we can see the variables co-vary, although energy is more volatile. 
Furthermore we can see that the two expansions have not grown in the same pace. 
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While world GNI per capita has grown 238 per cent, from 2.762 in 1980 to 
9.332 in 2006, energy consumption per capita has grown only 24 per cent from 
1.470 to 1.820 during the same period. But this does not mean that energy has 
ceased to be important in the late 20th century, as I will demonstrate. 
We must not confuse energy use with energy utilization. What the figures 
above, partly, illustrate is the increased energy efficiency in the world economy 
since the oil price shock of the 1970’s. The energy efficiency has doubled in many 
advanced economies (Lomborg 2001, p. 125-126). The same efficiency trend can 
be seen in motor vehicles; from 13.6 to 22.5 miles per gallon between 1973 and 
2007 (EIA 2008, Table 2.8, p. 59). Increasing efficiency is nothing unique to the 
late 20th century. 
 
Table 4: Cross Country Comparison: Energy and Income 
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/23/09   Time: 15:56   
Included observations: 127   
LNGNI=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 1.258181 0.324917 3.872319 0.0002 
C(2) 1.053000 0.044040 23.90989 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.820578     Mean dependent var 8.949092 
Adjusted R-squared 0.819143     S.D. dependent var 1.215545 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.119854   
     
     
Source: World Bank (www.worldbank.org) 
 
Figure 2: Correlation: Energy and Income: Cross Country  
 
From 1820 to 2003 the world 
economy expanded sixty-fold. The 
most prominent feature was the rapid 
expansion of machinery per capita, an 
increase of 155 in the U.K. and 372 in 
the U.S., at the same time energy 
consumption rose much more slowly 
(Maddison 2007, p. 73). This 
indicates rapidly increasing energy 
efficiency in machines (ibid., p. 73-
74). This development is actually 
what characterizes every machine 
from the first steam engines to the 
latest hybrid car. 
Nonetheless, the rapid increase in 
income relative to energy has sparked a decupling debate. The implications of this 
theory, its merits and limits, will be further discussed in section 2.3. 
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Another way of demonstrating the connection between energy and income is 
through a cross country comparison. Table 4 and Figure 2, above, show how high 
levels of energy consumption correlates with high gross national income levels 
and that correlation is very strong indeed.  
There exists no poor country with high energy inputs, and no rich country with 
low energy inputs. The natural logarithm of energy explains 82 per cent of the 
natural logarithm of income levels. This compares favourably to 57 per cent of the 
logarithm of GDP explained by the geographic model by Douglas Hibbs and Ola 
Olsson (2004), and 67 per cent of the institutional quality model in the same 
study. Only their combined model, geography and institutions, comes close with 
80 per cent of variation explained. (ibid., p. Table 3, p. 3719) 
 
Another method to find an energy-income connection would be to study 
individual countries with different levels of income. The same energy-income-
model applied to the world in Table 3 is here applied to individual countries. The 
results from these estimates are presented in Appendix 1. All presented results are 
statistically significant. 
When it comes to economic significance, the strongest can be found in 
countries that have developed most rapidly during the period, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia and China, all with determination coefficients between 99.6 and 93.5 per 
cent. These results are the most important, as we would expect correlation to 
matter most during periods of economic expansion. It is weaker for the more 
mature economies, like the U.S., 53.1 per cent; were trends are diverging from the 
1970’s. For poor countries, like Nigeria with energy consumption having a 
negative impact, there is virtually no correlation, only 29.9. We would not expect 
it to be strong. 
Furthermore, the U.S. and China, have slope coefficients of 2 and 3 
respectively, this is an indication that energy efficiency in these two giant carbon 
dioxide emitters has increased over time, most likely due to the extent of past 
wastefulness. The slope coefficient for Japan is only 1. But slope coefficients 
should not be over-interpreted. Post-war Japan has always been extremely energy 
efficient and the on par increase is just an indicator that economy has expanded 
while high energy efficiency was maintained. 
From the cross country analysis and the study of individual countries with 
different levels of income some conclusions can be drawn. First of all, no country 
has become rich without a significant increase in energy inputs. Secondly, energy 
plays different roles depending on were the country is on the income ladder. For 
rich countries, energy is important, but increasingly less so. For poor countries 
that have remained poor, energy is hardly significant at all. But those poor that 
have become or are becoming rich it is important beyond the point of vital. 
So we can safely say that there is an indisputable correlation between higher 
income and increased energy consumption. But correlation does not necessarily 
imply causality, and the direction of causality can, and probably does, go in the 
reverse direction. Higher income levels cause increasing demand for electricity 
and energy intense consumer goods. I believe that would be the result of any year-
to-year survey. 
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However causality is up for debate. Shahid Alam (2009) implies that there is 
some form of causality. In fact he views the economy in terms of energy flows 
and stress that it should be included in the neoclassical growth models (ibid., p. 2-
3), even though he himself does not present any remodelling. In modern growth 
theory energy resources are only included as a deduction in growth rates as they 
become increasingly scarce. The consequence however is deemed to be modest 
(Jones 2002, p. 176-177, 189). Although I share Alam’s concerns about the 
inadequacy of the current approach to energy, the reason for the thesis, I have to 
agree with the authors who oppose such statements of direct causality. 
Smil, for instance, strongly opposes any claims of direct causality between 
energy use and economic growth. He exemplifies that while the Soviet Union put 
massive energy inputs into its economy, the richer Japan used less energy with far 
greater efficiency (Smil 1994, 252-253). Smil even goes as far as to state that; any 
energy centred narrative is fallacy. In his view, energy does not explain the major 
events in history, and energy inputs can only really guarantee pollution (ibid., p. 
253-256), not income. 
There is however a major logic problem with Smil’s account. After stating that 
energy should not be the focus for economic development, he also states that we 
should learn to accept a low energy economy and thereby also a lower, or no, 
growth rate (ibid., p. 256). And while I agree with Smil, that energy in itself 
certainly does not explain major historical events, and while efficiency is naturally 
more important than the amount of input. The fact remains that neither Japan, as 
shown in Appendix 1, nor any other nation has managed an industrial transition 
without a massive increase in energy consumption. 
 
Table 5: Electricity by Source, share (%) in brackets 
(Billion Kilowatthours) 
Country/ 
Source 
Thermal Hydro. Nuclear Renew. Total 
China 2 225.06 
(81.88) 
431.43 
(15.88) 
54.85 
(2.02) 
6.16 
(0.23) 
2 717.50 
(100.00) 
Japan 633.68 
(61.36) 
84.90 
(8.22) 
288.26 
(27.91) 
25.86 
(2.50) 
1 032.70 
(100.00) 
U.K. 280.38 
(75.38) 
4.56 
(1.23) 
71.68 
(19.27) 
15.34 
(4.12) 
371.95 
(100.00) 
Sweden 3.99 
(2.88) 
61.11 
(44.10) 
63.63 
(45.93) 
9.83 
(7.09) 
138.55 
(100.00) 
U.S. 2 884.39 
(70.85) 
289.25 
(7.10) 
787.22 
(19.34) 
110.40 
(2.71) 
4 071.26 
(100.00) 
World 11 943.04 
(66.30) 
2 997.06 
(16.64) 
2 660,26 
(14.77) 
414,31 
(2.30) 
18 014,67 
(100.00) 
Source: Based on EIA 2006: Recent Electricity Generation Based by Type. (www.eia.org) 
 
Another way of looking at the importance of fossil fuels is by its share in 
current electricity consumption, see Table 5 above. Thermal energy from fossil 
fuels makes up a vast majority as the source of the worlds electricity, especially 
prominent in the world’s largest economies; the U.S., China and Japan. Sweden 
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together with Norway, not included, has a far higher share of hydroelectric power 
than most industrialized nations, but only because of natural endowments. 
But electricity generation does not provide a complete picture, as it is at the 
cleanest end of our energy consumption. Internal combustion engines are used 
both in transportation and various forms of production, e.g. mining, irrigation 
pumps, etc. All in all; oil, gas, and coal provide a whopping 80 per cent of the 
world’s energy needs (Lomborg 2001, Figure 71, p. 130). 
 
Now that we have confirmed the centrality of energy inputs in the modern 
economy, let us now return to the industrial revolution. Let us ask whether energy 
utilization had a decisive role in the higher growth trajectory experienced from 
this point in history. This question is partly linked to the debate of how much of 
revolution the industrial revolution actually was?  
As we have seen above economic growth has been exponential ever since the 
19th century. But this does not automatically answer whether we should see 
growth as a linear process that took off, into a whole new trajectory, or as a 
continuous exponential process? 
There are two schools of thought on the industrial process that started in 18th 
and 19th century Britain; continuity and take off? The first school sees it as a 
continuation, be it an acceleration, of a growth that started centuries before the so 
called revolution, and that it more a question of industrial evolution. And if the 
industrial revolution was a continuous exponential process that started much 
earlier, energy may not have been the crucial component. 
The continuation or revisionist school, stressing gradual development, was led 
by Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole. Knick Harley (1982) and Nicholas Crafts 
(1985) found that growth has not been as impressive as previously thought. This 
view is also accepted in the narrative of Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal (2003) 
stressing the gradual aspect of the industrial revolution, at least prior to the mid-
19th century. While Joel Mokyr (1990) and David Landes (1998) both share the 
view that the industrial revolution was indeed a revolution. 
Crafts (1985) stresses the slow growth in productivity and relatively slow 
economic growth during industrial revolution, 0.6 to 1.7 per cent, at least before 
1830. This claim may actually strengthen any view about the importance of 
energy. As we shall see, steam power became a major source of British energy 
supplies only after 1830. But the importance of steam power has also been 
challenged by Crafts (2004). He sees a narrative of 19th century industrial 
development in Britain centred on steam as misleading. Let us examine that view. 
Crafts argues that steam power did not contribute much to the total factor 
productivity or capital deepening of 19th century Britain and less than the ITC-
sector has in our days. With growth accounting, Crafts claim that steam did not 
contribute much, even to the modest growth. But is not as devastating to an 
energy utilization hypothesis as it may seem? 
First let us take a look on what Crafts does not say. Let us remember that 
steam power is not equal to coal energy. A dramatic increase in coal inputs in 
metallurgy drove steel prices down and quantity and quality up (Smil 1994, 
Mokyr 1990), making industrial inputs far less expensive. 
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And then what Crafts he does say. When it comes to Crafts conclusions he 
misses the point, total factor productivity and capital deepening do not capture the 
contribution of the new power source. From 1831 to 1870 only one-third of 
British growth came from total factor productivity, the remaining two-thirds came 
from capital and labour in roughly equal shares (Crafts 2004, Table 1, p. 339). 
Furthermore, most of the capital added was centred on steam technology, perhaps 
not in the initial phase of the industrial revolution, but inarguably later on. Some 
of the growing factor productivity came from structural advances, like the move 
out of agriculture in to industry. This also would have been impossible without the 
addition of capital stock, which owed much to cheaper inputs. Only the growth in 
the labour force, caused by improvements in agriculture, has no clear links to coal 
at this time. Also early 19th century food transport was fairly independent from 
steam technology, as canals were of higher importance than the railroad. 
Looking at the sheer output of energy supplied by steam power, see Table 6 
below, it is hard to imagine any other source could have provided the energy 
needed in the expanding production. And herein lays the problem with a sheer per 
capita growth assessment of the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution 
was not so much a question of higher labour productivity, as one of increased 
production. Population expanded almost on par with productivity (Mokyr 1990, p. 
82), at least up until 1830. Later, between 1831 and 1873, British per capita 
growth picked up to 2.4 per cent (Crafts 2004, Table 1, p. 339). This corresponds 
in time with the shift towards coal powered steam technology. 
 
Table 6: Sources of power in Britain, 1760-1907 
(Horse power) 
Source/Year 1760 1800 1830 1870 1907 
Steam 5,000 35,000 165,000 2,060,000 9,659,000 
Water 70,000 120,000 165,000 230,000 178,000 
Wind 10,000 15,000 20,000 10,000 5,000 
Total 85,000 170,000 350,000 2,300,000 9,842,000 
Source: Crafts 2004, p. 342, Table 3 
 
The question of take-off versus continuation can be linked to the question about 
divergence between Western Europe and/or Great Britain and the rest of the 
world. When did it begin and how dramatic was it? A short summary and 
selections from the debate is justified: 
The notion of a significant economic advantage for Western Europe in pre-
industrial times, which had reigned since Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max 
Weber, was cemented by e.g. Douglass North. This view was challenged by 
Andre Gunder Frank (1998), in his ReOrient, stating that there was no major 
difference in living standards between Europe and the more developed parts of 
Asia prior to 1800. David Landes (1998) in his The Wealth and Poverty of 
Nations in turn refutes Gunder Frank’s claims as pure nonsense. Kenneth 
Pomeranz (2000) in his The Great Divergence revives the argument, that there 
was little or no difference in living standards between Europe and China or Japan 
up until 1750. 
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Pomeranz may or may not be correct about his assumptions about Chinese 
economy, more about this in Chapter 3, but for now it is his main point that is of 
interest for the current purpose. Not seeing any major difference in standard of 
living, capital availability, innovations or institutional arrangements that could 
have caused an industrial breakthrough in any continent prior to 1750 he argues: 
That without the ecologic relief offered by the New World and coal inputs, 
England would have run into diminishing returns to capital and labour instead of 
an industrial revolution. The ecological situation at the time of the industrial 
revolution will serve as evidence. 
During the 18th century all of the densely populated core regions of the world 
began to feel ecological stress (ibid., p. 211-212). The stress in England was 
becoming increasingly acute (ibid., p. 215-217), and had it not been alleviated 
with imports of cotton from the Americas, grain from Ireland (ibid., p. 217), sugar 
from the Caribbean and iron and timber from America, Scandinavia and the Baltic 
region, diminishing return would certainly already have been in place. The 25-30 
million “ghost acres” added to Britain from the combined imports surpasses its 
own arable land with margins (ibid., p. 276). The rest of the world did not have 
the same kind of peripheries to draw land intense goods from, or export capital 
intense goods to. Moreover no other nation had coal as geographically available 
as England, close to its industrial core, in contrast to China (ibid., p. 61-64). Coal 
deposits gave England an equivalent of 15-21 million additional acres of forest 
per annum. Without these resources England would have run into diminishing 
returns, and probably forces down a labour intense growth path rather than an 
energy and capital intense one (ibid., p. 280-281). Such a development would 
have been aggravated as England’s traditional raw material supplying peripheries, 
like Northern Germany and the U.S., started catering to there own infant 
industries in the mid-19th century. Without the new energy inputs the industrial 
revolution could still have become an unprecedented pre-industrial boom, but 
diminishing returns would have disabled any overall higher growth trajectory. 
At first it may appear that Pomeranz offers the answer to all my problems, but 
in fact, he highlights other necessary factors for economic development than just 
energy resources. He sees American cotton and other colonial commodities as 
vital to the industrial revolution in England, perhaps even more so than coal (ibid., 
p. 276). And there is no point in arguing about the importance of energy resources 
when other inputs were just as pivotal. 
To counter this line of thought, I will have to look at industrial processes 
outside of England. Germany as an example became industrialized based on its 
steel and chemical industries (Cameron & Neal 2003, p. 306-308), neither cotton 
nor other colonial commodities were available in large volumes. The same can be 
said for most other continental European economies. 
This reasoning opens up to an array of contra factual speculation: Could any 
continental European nation have industrialized without England in the lead? 
Well, many 18th century innovations did originate in England, but many also had 
their origin in other nations (Mokyr 1990, p. 240), like the vacuum conservation 
of food by Nicolas Appert or the soda making process of Nicolas LeBlanc, both 
Frenchmen. Other European nations were not in a technological backwater 
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compared to Britain and industrialization on the continent may have been 
possible, but this remains speculations. Nonetheless the continental European 
nations show us that industrialization as a process is possible without cheap 
colonial goods. So while energy resources are not the only necessary inputs, they 
constitute the only common denominator that would enable not just the industrial 
revolution as we know it, but any feasible industrial process. 
And this is also what happens. During the early industrial revolution, 1750-
1830, we see that the technological improvements fail to render much economic 
growth. Only after 1830, when steam power makes its breakthrough was long 
term economic growth made possible. And even if water power improved 
drastically during the 18th century (ibid., p. 90-91), looking at the contemporary 
U.K. with over 75 per cent of its electricity generated by thermal energy it is hard 
to imagine any viable substitutes, see Table 5 on page 16. 
In this sense the industrial revolution was an undisputable take-off. Not 
because there were no or even little innovations made previously, 17th century 
Holland and 18th century England achieved growth rates impressive at the time. 
But had it not been for the new energy resources made available, there would not 
have been any continuous exponential growth. Today, that growth has yielded 
unprecedented high living standards across the globe, although very unevenly 
distributed. In terms of “servants” given by additional energy, today each 
European has 150, each Indian 15, and American 300 (Lomborg 2001, p. 119).  
What then is the relationship between energy and economic growth? Drawing 
on both the analysis of contemporary economies and past experience I feel 
confident in stating that: While energy is not a sufficient condition for industrial 
growth, it is however necessary. It is the sine qua non of long term economic 
growth. Without substantial energy inputs no nation can hope to achieve high 
overall incomes. Traditionally this has only been achieved through massive inputs 
of fossil fuels, with adverse consequences to environment and health. Such 
statements have immense moral implications and raises acute questions about 
responsibilities of those nations already rich and those aspiring to become so. 
2.2.3 Consequences 
Energy does neither cause economic nor population expansion, but enables them, 
it is the sine qua non of economic and population growth. Improved nutrition has 
historically led to population growth, eroding long term economic growth per 
capita, Malthus’s dismal science. Only with the massive increase of energy input, 
due to the utilization of fossil fuels in production, have we experienced long term 
economic growth. In order to understand why this conclusion is important to 
reiterate, we must ask: What consequences does this have? 
The growing strategic importance of the Middle East may highlight the 
importance of energy. Even so, I agree with Smil (1994, p. 251-256) that energy 
utilization does not explain the major events in history, e.g. the rise and fall of 
empires, the civil rights movement or female participation in the labour market. 
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However I would like to add: That even though energy can not explain most 
major event in world history, they are indispensible in explaining the single two 
most revolutionizing: The shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture and the 
shift from artisanal to industrial manufacturing. 
In practice for economic theory; the emphasis on energy challenges the 
absolute emphasis on institutions and as the sole factor that enables of growth in 
the long run. Regardless of how well developed and functioning institutions we 
have, without energy – they will not materialize into economic growth. 
The same goes for financial capital, at least in the early stages of the industrial 
revolution. One must remember that it was not lack of financial resources that 
made progress slow in the pre-industrial societies; rather it was a lack of 
investment opportunities (Braudel 1979, quoted in Pomeranz 2000, p. 179). 
Instead of investment in modern real capital, e.g. machinery and industrial 
infrastructure, financial resources were often channel towards luxury 
consumption, warfare, shipment, or agricultural infrastructure. The technology 
was just not in place yet and thereby nor was the ability to utilize the required 
energy for such investments. 
But surely it is those innovations that are of importance, and not the energy? 
We have seen above that energy resources do not make any difference to growth 
without the right technology to utilize it (Mokyr 1990, p. 159-162). But the exact 
same logic can be reversed. Technology in itself does not create a whole new 
growth trajectory without the energy to power it. What is the point in having a 
brand new laptop, or any electric appliance, without the electricity to run it? 
However, it is clear that energy utilization per se has not caused economic 
growth. But then we must also formulate what has. The answer of course is to be 
found in our capabilities, our technology, or as expressed in this thesis our ability 
to utilize energy. The merits with this formulation or reformulation of technology 
will be discussed in the following section. 
2.3 Ability Determines 
Energy is the sine qua non of industrialization. And, neither technology without 
energy nor energy without technology can fully explain the unprecedented 
demographic and economic growth since the industrial revolution. To 
reformulate; it is not energy utilization per se, but the ability to utilize energy that 
determines economic growth, or material prosperity to be more correct. Below I 
have formalized the relationship between energy utilization and material 
prosperity in a hypothesis. 
 
Humanity’s material prosperity is determined by our ability to utilize the 
energy in our surrounding environment. 
 
Such an energy centred hypothesis is not without its problems. Let me here 
pick up the decupling debate that I so rudely dropped in the beginning of sub- 
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Section 2.2.1. In the U.S. energy has fallen both as factor share and in per capita 
terms since the oil price shock in 1973 (Jones 2002, p. 183-184). And Denmark 
has actually managed to increase its GDP per capita while decreasing its energy 
consumption (Lomborg 2001, p. 126). 
One reason, as stated above is increasing energy efficiency, i.e. increased 
ability. But another factor is the ever higher and growing share of GDP coming 
from the less energy intense service sector. Not only has the service sector grown 
in terms of share of employment, especially in the public sector, but the service 
content of manufactured goods has also risen (Bryson, Daniels and Warf 2004). 
Much of the value addition to goods today stems from the drawing board, and not 
the assembly line. Design and branding determines more of the price than the 
energy required per unit. 
But acknowledging that energy is becoming less and less important for income 
in the industrialized economies is not the same as saying that it will become an 
obsolete component in economic development. This development is actually quite 
hopeful if we believe in a sustainable future. But energy utilization will always 
continue to matter for the rich, even more so for the poor striving to become rich. 
Remember that the statistical analysis in sub-Section 2.2.2 and the data presented 
in Appendix 1 show that all nations that have become rich, or substantially richer, 
during the period are those where increased energy consumption seems to have 
mattered the most. But probably they will use less, and hopefully cleaner, energy 
as their economies develop, for all our sakes. 
And when looking at the contemporary energy situation, our dependence on 
fossil fuels, and its implications for the economy and the sustainability of growth; 
we all inevitably have to make a transition to a sustainable growth path. 
 
Now note that the expression; “our ability to utilize energy”, is actually just a 
redefinition of technological improvement, but it implies that energy innovations 
holds some form of economic primacy. The combustion engine meant more for 
the world economy than the once so popular toy Tamagotchi. This can help 
explain why the increasing numbers of issued patent (Jones, p. 91-93) are not 
yielding higher growth rates in the industrialized economies.  
This does not dispute the importance of technology for economic growth. Its 
central role is evident and has been formalized in economic growth theory by e.g. 
Robert Solow. In the Solow model technology is the ultimate determinant of 
growth (Jones 2002, p. 36-38). Although given exogenously; the growth rate of 
technology will determine the growth rate of any economy in the long run or, 
more accurately, in the so called steady state (ibid., p. 38-43). Technology is also 
the main growth component for all subsequent economic growth models. 
But this does not conflict with the notion that some innovations are more 
important to economic growth than others. This is quite logical and has already 
been noted by many. And in Lennart Schön’s accounts (2000); of the key 
innovations that drives structural cycles, a majority were within the fields of 
energy utilization or transmission. 
Does this rethinking of economic growth have any policy implications? It 
could imply that I would recommend a shift in policy towards energy research. 
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Although research in renewable energy resources is vital for our future, 
breakthroughs can come from almost any direction. Take electricity, so central to 
improved energy utilization. When first discovered it was mostly used as a 
novelty for practical jokes and its primary applications thought to be within 
medicine as electro-chock therapy. 
Viewing energy resources as exogenous has immense drawbacks as it limits 
our understanding of the industrial revolution and present day economic 
prosperity, but also in our ability to grasp interconnectedness between energy, 
labour and capital. Alam (2009, p. 4-6) contrasts this to land in the classic growth 
model, which did put a limit on growth. 
Note that I do not, like Alam, see that energy absolutely has to be incorporated 
in the modern growth models. Even though its absence limits capabilities of 
explaining the shift in growth trajectories, modern growth theory still manages to 
explain growth in the modern industrialized world quite well. And I can not see, 
nor does Alam to my knowledge present, any method of incorporating energy into 
the modern growth models. Still energy should be seen as an indispensible part of 
explaining economic growth, and limits to the same. 
For even if fossil energy resources will continue to be available in the near 
future, and peak oil may be far away, views I share with Lomborg (2001). I 
strongly disagree about his views on the harm caused on the environment, not just 
climate change, but also the general degradation of ground water supplies, sea and 
air. These concerns become even more acute if we believe that all human beings 
should have access to the prosperity that we in the West experience. 
And even though our immediate concern should be environment rather than 
resource depletion (Smil 1994), the mere logic behind finite resources must 
convince us that their presence should not be taken for granted in the very long 
run. Civilization should not be built and sustained just centuries, but millennia. 
Supported by the fact that fossil fuels have been indispensible for our current 
population size and income levels I have to disagree with Al Gore’s logic: That 
we can not rely only on improved technology but must also conserve. Instead I 
would stress: We can not rely only on conservation, we must improve technology! 
In other words we must continue to improve our ability to utilize energy. But, 
if our material prosperity is determined by this ability, the question that arises and 
should be tackled now is: What actually determines our ability to utilize energy? 
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3 The Ability to Utilize Energy 
We have already seen that without fossil energy inputs innovations by themselves 
could not have caused the industrial growth trajectory. On the other hand, those 
energy resources have always been available for utilization by anyone with the 
right technology. Even if we can accept that our material prosperity depends on 
our ability to utilize energy and that economic growth is almost, but not entirely, 
linked to material prosperity, the question still remains: What has determined the 
differences in the ability to utilize energy resources? 
Central to the debate about what was the root causes of the technological 
achievements brought on by the industrial revolution and the new trajectory of 
growth, is when the process actually started. This question is inevitably linked to 
that of when the divergence between Western Europe and the rest of the world 
began. In Section 3.1, I will examine this debate concerning divergence. In 
Section 3.2, I will examine how initial resource endowments have affected 
different levels of technology. Innovations themselves may have had an effect on 
innovativeness and institutions that facilitate innovativeness were crucial for long 
term development, these factors will be discussed in Section 3.3. 
3.1 Different Abilities 
For the purpose of understanding why some nations have reached high levels of 
technology and income while others have not, we must ask: How large was the 
technological and economic divergence and when did it start? 
Let us recapitulate from Chapter 2 the debate surrounding global divergence in 
the pre-industrial world: The notion of a significant advantage for Western Europe 
goes back to Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max Weber, and has in modern times 
been reiterated by Douglass North (e.g. North & Thomas 1973). But this view was 
challenged by Andre Gunder Frank (1998) who claimed that there was no major 
difference prior to the industrial revolution. 
David Landes (1998) in his turn refutes Gunder Frank’s claims and repeats the 
argument that Western Europe was well ahead of the rest of the world centuries 
before the industrial revolution. He stresses the superiority of West European 
institutions as well as its innovations. Landes’s work is mostly a historical 
narrative relying on qualitative sources, with few quantifications or comparative 
data. It should absolutely not be disregarded on that basis, but it becomes hard for 
an economist to evaluate his argumentation.  
Angus Maddison, on the other hand, is one of the foremost sources of 
quantitative historical data. His work of estimating past levels of population and 
  25 
GDP per capita is unique in scope and scale, and because of this he has become 
the main source of historical economic data even in this thesis. He also sees a 
divergence between Western Europe and the rest of the world, between the 11th 
and the 16th century (Maddison 2007, p. 70-71). However his estimates should not 
be accepted without some scrutiny. For instance, he relies heavily on urbanization 
ratios (e.g. Maddison 2001); especially in his assessment of the China-Europe 
divide (Maddison 1998). 
The urbanization ratio is a widely accepted measure with an enormous 
theoretical appeal. In pre-industrial societies we would expect large agricultural 
surplus and productivity in the countryside to push people into cities. Moreover 
commercialization and urbanization go hand in hand and could have had a pull-
effect on industrious and adventurous individuals. Cities could offer a larger scope 
for specialization and thereby higher income. 
When examining contemporary data we find an almost 53 per cent correlation 
between the logarithm of urbanization ratio and the logarithm of GDP per capita. 
Explaining more than half the variation, this would give support the theoretical 
assumptions above. But when looking at poor nations below the $2.000-line, 
below which we would find all pre-industrial nations, there is virtually no 
correlation, see Appendix 2. There is no denying that Europe had a growing share 
of its people living in cities, a share increasing with income. In China no similar 
development can be seen. But keep in mind that city-dwellers of the time were not 
necessarily better of than their rural contemporaries. Also Maddison’s data on life 
expectancy is biased against East Asia as infanticide was a common family 
planning practice there (Pomeranz 2000, p. 38). 
 
Table 7: Share of World GDP for Chosen Regions 
(per cent of world total) 
Region/Year 1500 1700 1820 1913 1998 
China 25.0 22.3 32.9 8.9 11.5 
India 24.5 24.4 16.0 7.6 5.0 
Japan 3.1 4.1 3.0 2.6 7.7 
W. Europe 17.9 22.5 23.6 33.5 20.6 
U.K. 1.1 2.9 5.2 8.3 3.3 
U.S. 0.3 0.1 1.8 19.1 21.9 
World 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Maddison 2001, Appendix B, p. 263, Table B-20 
 
Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) makes extensive use of data to support his claim 
that China and Japan, and to a lesser extent India, was on the same level of living 
standards as Western Europe prior to the industrial revolution. Pomeranz argues 
that China were not behind Europe in the 18th century. He estimates Chinese life 
expectancy to have been between 35 to 40 years, comparable to that of England 
(ibid., p. 36-38). And caloric intake is estimated to be similar or above that of 
Western Europe (ibid., p. 39). We must keep in mind that Chinese agriculture was 
much more productive, although far more labour intensive, than the European. It 
yielded on average about 2.5 tonnes per hectare during the 17th century (Smil 
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1994, p. 62-63), compared to 1.5 tonnes of wheat per hectare in 19th century 
Western Europe (ibid., Figure 3.15, p. 75). 
Although nutrition, and especially grain (Parthasarathi 1998, p. 83), 
constituted a majority of pre-industrial consumption overall living standards are 
harder to quantify and compare. But the number of pieces of furniture in rural 
households (Pomeranz 2000, p. 144-146) and everyday luxury consumption per 
capita was roughly the same in China as in Western Europe (ibid., p. 117-127). 
Historical economic research on India is harder to come by and data is sparser 
than on China and Japan. However we are not left completely in the dark. For 
instance, Prannad Parthasarthi (1998) assesses the performance of the South 
Indian pre-industrial economy. He explains that the low prices of Indian goods 
and cheap labour did not result from oppressively low wages, but low grain 
prices. This gave the South Indian farmers and weavers a purchasing power 
comparable or superior to English grain wages (ibid., p. 83-89). Does this imply 
similar living standard? It might, but in my own recent experience I have found 
that tropical climate also requires a higher caloric intake, so not necessarily. 
The decline of India in the world economy began prior to the industrial 
revolution, both in relative and absolute terms, according to most estimates (e.g. 
Maddison 2001), India’s share of the world economy declined from 24.4 to 16.0 
per cent during the 18th century, see Table 7. David Clingsmith and Jeffrey 
Williamson (2005) ask what reasons there might have been for this “de-
industrialization”. They give a two-pronged explanation. 
First the internal problems due to the fragmentation of the Mughal Empire 
from the early 18th century led to increased taxation and increased own-wages in 
the manufacturing sector. In turn this led to increasing prices of Indian 
manufactured goods. India lost much of its export market as a consequence (ibid., 
p. 20). And, during the 19th century India would loose much of its domestic 
market, mainly to the British. This was caused by the British industrialization and 
India’s free trade commitment under colonial administration (ibid., p. 20-21). But 
the India was still a giant in the 18th century global economy. 
The views of Pomeranz and Parthasarthi have been challenged by Steven 
Broadberry and Bishmupriya Gupta (2006), repeating the argument that Western 
Europe was striving ahead of the rest of the World long before the industrial 
revolution (ibid., p. 26-27). Although wages in terms of grain were fairly similar, 
they observe a large and growing difference in silver wages between Western 
Europe and Asia. However, their claim rest on the assumption that the silver wage 
gap is not a monetary phenomenon resulting from Western Europe having more 
silver flowing through their economy. 
They argue that this was not the case, relying on the fact that the bimetallic 
ratio of gold and silver converged over time (ibid., p. 21-23). Silver was worth 
relatively more in India and China, than in Europe, due to the shipments of silver 
mined in Spanish America. This created an arbitrage situation for European 
merchants, paying relatively little silver in Asian ports and upon returning they 
received relatively large amounts of silver, above regular trade profits that is. This 
could continue until the massive inflows of silver made its price versus other 
goods converge between the regions. This has been measured by the gold-silver 
  27 
ratio, which converged in 1650, then diverged, to converge again in 1750 to 15 
units of silver per unit of gold in both England and China (ibid., Table 11, p. 23). 
However, if there was an arbitrage situation reflected in the gold-silver ratio 
there is also another possibility, direct arbitrage between gold and silver. Turning 
to the history books this is exactly what we find. The initial trade between China 
and the European trading companies were actually dominated by gold bullion 
from China and silver bullion in the reverse direction. This trade reached a peak in 
1720-1750 (Wild 1999, p. 44). Such an explanation fits better in time than 
absolute trade volumes, which peaked decades later. 
Furthermore, keep in mind that only one third of the European silver reached 
Asia (Maddison 2007, p. 91), where it was received by China and India, each 
economy as large as the European. And although these countries also experienced 
inflation it seems unlikely that the amount of silver received from trade would 
push real prices and wages to European levels. For these reasons I wish to refute 
the conclusions drawn by Broadberry and Gupta. If there was a great divergence 
prior to the industrial revolution it can not be shown by the silver wage gap. 
Although one observation made by Broadberry and Gupta should be taken 
more seriously. During the 18th and 19th century grain wages fell, first in India 
(ibid., Table 6, p. 17) and then in China (ibid., Table 9, p. 19), both relative to the 
U.K. and in absolute terms. This indicates that the two Asian giants had begun to 
run into diminishing returns. 
But there is still some substantial evidence that the divergence prior to the 
industrial revolution was not as wide as previously thought. Does such a 
conclusion have any major consequences? Well, limited divergence before the 
industrial revolution reiterates its centrality for the continuation of Western 
economic dominance, and above all their ability to pull further ahead of the pack. 
But in other respect it would not have mattered. Europe was militarily dominant 
long before it became economically dominant. And nothing could have stopped 
the decline of the Mughal and the Manchu dynasties, which succumbed as much 
to internal as external pressure. 
After this long journey we are not much wiser. The conclusions drawn here 
are just one addition to a debate that has raged, and will continue to rage, among 
economic historians. The fact remains that Western Europe still was the first that 
acquired the ability to utilize fossil fuels in large scale production, followed, and 
later surpassed by the U.S. Let us now move ahead to the major suggested 
explanations of long term technologic development and economic growth. 
3.2 Endowments 
If we are dependent on the ability to utilize energy in our surrounding 
environment, perhaps the explanation to technological development lay in the 
environment itself? How has the endowment of natural resources, climate, biology 
and minerals, helped facilitate innovations? 
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An entire school of thought circles around this line. In the early 20th century 
Ellsworth Huntington of Yale attempted to explain the interplay between humans 
and their surrounding environment. But attributing almost every aspect of human 
history to geography, he and his followers went too far. After World War II 
geography, which had unfairly been caught in the draught of smelly racial 
ideology, was shunned by the intelligentsia (Landes 1998, p. 27). But in one sense 
geography is perhaps the least “racist” of all possible explanations, as it has the 
odd ability to condemn a nation to poverty, without blaming anyone. It is not your 
fault for being born in the “wrong” country.  
The logic appeal of geography is obvious. Without the existence of energy 
resources it would be impossible to utilize them. And, if the energy utilization is 
the sine qua non of economic growth, then resource endowment is the sine qua 
non of energy utilization. Furthermore, geography as opposed to both energy 
utilization and institutions has no issues with direction of causality. Both higher 
energy consumption and good institutions could be the effects of higher income, 
whereas beneficial climate can not.  
And the fact remains that the richest contemporary economies are found in the 
temperate zones (ibid., p. 29). Deserts are barren by nature and lack of water 
prohibits large populations. Tropical zones, containing a vast majority of the 
world’s species, seem to disfavour humans with disease carrying parasites, heat 
and humidity. But climate alone does not guarantee growth, the temperate pre-
Columbian North America was sparsely populated and guesstimated to be 
relatively poor (Maddison 2001). Neither is temperate climate absolutely 
necessary for high income levels, or high growth, demonstrated by modern day 
Singapore and Malaysia respectively. But we must also remember that geography 
does not equal climate. 
Jared Diamond (1997) forwards a more comprehensive theory on the 
relationship between geography and economic development. In his influential 
book Guns, germs and steel, he shows how animals and plants suitable for 
domestication gave different conditions of feeding growing populations and 
fostering economic growth. He also describes how domesticated animals 
transferred microbes to their masters, which in the long run built up a system of 
immunity. These microbes were later decisive in the European victory over the 
Native Americans, who lacked both large domesticated animals and microbes 
(ibid., p. 197-199). 
Diamond offers us a unique insight into the differences between the Americas, 
Australia-Oceania and sub-Saharan Africa on one side and Eurasia and North 
Africa on the other. Of course we have no data from the three former regions and 
have to guesstimate their standard of living. These guesstimates are mostly based 
on foreign, often hostile, sources, archaeological evidence or oral tradition. 
Diamond’s theories have been quantified by Douglas Hibbs and Ola Olsson 
(2004). Through categorizing the world’s nations in terms of biogeography 
depending on initial numbers of flora and fauna suitable for domestication, they 
find a substantial correlation of 57 per cent between the logarithm of income and a 
combined biogeography measurement (ibid., p. 3718-3719). 
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But their results rest on a series of assumptions that can not be accepted at face 
value. First of all; North America and Australia have been classified into the West 
Asia-Europe category, the richest endowed (ibid., p. 3716). There is nothing 
wrong with this, as these regions received all flora and fauna from their European 
masters. But why beef producing Argentina or soy bean exporting Brazil is not 
classified in this category remains up for debate. And even if the correlation 
would hold today, it does not explain why China was technologically ahead of 
Europe up until the 15th century (Mokyr 1990, p. 209-218). 
In fact, Diamond’s overall explanation of differences within Eurasia is not 
very satisfying. And herein lay the flaw in his theories. His notion of a politically 
unified China, due to and cohesive land mass (ibid., p. 431-433), is unconvincing. 
Since its unification by the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE, China has only been 
politically unified two-thirds of its history. Uniquely unified compared to other 
entities of the time, but still shattered compared to a unitary and internally 
coherent state. 
Arguments in a similar line to Diamond’s have been forwarded by Marvin 
Harris (1977), in turn inspired by Karl Wittfogel. He argues that the two major 
navigable and silt rich rivers, the Huang He and the Chang Jiang, both helped 
coherence and also required a unitary state for flood control and vast water 
management projects. But today we know that most of these water projects were 
managed locally (Mokyr 1990, p. 235), only the major required the state. 
Moving on to Europe and England, it is clear that they were assisted by the 
availability of easily mined coal close to their manufacturing centres (Pomeranz 
2000, p. 65-66). And no one can deny that the U.S. benefitted from its vast 
resources in land, minerals and petroleum. But the mere existence of resources 
does not cause them to be utilized (Mokyr 1990, p. 160-162). Similarly we have 
already concluded, in section 2.1, that use of fossil fuels in production did not 
automatically cause uninterrupted economic growth or technological progress. 
Looking at contemporary petroleum producing countries there is no evidence 
that endowments foster an increased technological ability to utilize those 
resources. It has actually been suggested that this resource endowment is harmful 
for those economies (e.g. Landes 2008, p. 468-469). And although many are 
prosperous in terms of income per capita, this income is unevenly distributed and 
innovativeness has been sidelined by luxury consumption. Lately, some capital 
differentiation has occurred, mainly into real estate and financial markets. The 
most shining example of this is Dubai, which has also been investing in tourism. 
Geography is of undeniable importance. Diamond’s narrative of the 
differences between pre-Columbian America and Eurasia serves as an excellent 
example. But so far we have not seen any evidence that the environment in itself 
can explain technological progress. Temperate climate, biological endowment, 
energy or other mineral resources, none have singlehandedly fostered our ability 
to utilize the energy in our surrounding environment. 
If the answer is not found exclusively in nature, then let us now turn to our 
societies. To what degree can institutions, the norms, regulations and 
organizations that we have created for ourselves, contribute to our understanding 
of differences in technology and economic growth? 
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3.3 Institutions 
Although, before we turn to the relationship between institutions and innovations, 
let us take a look at technology in itself, and ask: Can technology in itself cause 
further technological improvement?  
Innovations can be improvements in technology and new ways of organizing 
the means of production. All innovations have to build on earlier technology to 
some extent, whether domestic or foreign. The steam engine by James Watt owes 
much to the machine by Thomas Newcomen (Mokyr 1990, p. 85). And the Queen 
Elizabeth launch in 1938, the largest steamship ever built, owes much to the 1818 
Savannah, the first steamship to cross the Atlantic, although she did so mostly by 
sail. Improvements are often more impressive than the initial invention, just look 
at the USB-stick. The phenomenon, that innovations lead to further innovation 
and so on, has been called path dependency (ibid., p. 163). 
But high technological levels do not necessarily result in ever more 
innovations. China demonstrates the point through the widely cited example of the 
Ming and Qing dynasty, from the 15th to 20th century. China saw major 
technological advances during the Song dynasty, 10th to 13th century, but then 
innovativeness slowed in pace (ibid., p. 218-220). Similarly, explaining why 
technologically backward nations can catch up through the concept of path 
dependency may be complicated. Technology is not sufficient for further 
development and only necessary in a very short and immediate term. 
Before commencing the discussion of how institutions have determined 
innovativeness, let us just contemplate that innovations can shape institutions. The 
cannon helped kings gain control over castle-owning knights and without the 
invention of paper the extent of modern bureaucracies would be far more limited. 
The Internet is another perfect example of how technology can shape our norms, 
our organization of work life and the way we interact with each other. 
 
The concept of institutions is usually defined very broadly. They constitute the 
norms and values, but also formal regulations within a society (Hay 2002, p. 106). 
But they can just as well be any form of organization; state, church, etc. 
Institutions are widely accepted in economic growth theory as crucial for an 
innovative environment that facilitates growth (e.g. Jones 2002, p. 143-147). Even 
Joel Mokyr (1990), who stresses the importance of innovations, also attributes 
differences in innovativeness among the world’s nations to institutional 
arrangements. And Landes (1998), while stressing the revolutionary aspect of the 
industrial development during the 18th and 19th century, trace the root causes of 
growth to the institutional setting of Western Europe back to the Middle Ages. 
But then we must ask; exactly what institutions, historically and contemporary, 
have been most favourable for innovativeness and economic growth? 
Douglass North is regarded as the main pioneer behind the institutional 
school. Together with Robert Thomas (1977) in their Rise of the Western World 
they see shifting labour to land ratios in Western Europe after the Black Death as 
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vital for the empowerment of the peasantry vis-à-vis the landed nobility. This in 
turn led to more entrenched property rights and political power for commoners. 
Landes (1998) stresses the importance of innovativeness fostered by 
institutions, and in this sense, largely reaffirms what has been stated by Adam 
Smith, Max Weber and Douglass North. He contrasts the narrow minded and 
imperial despotism of Asia with the market friendly and business promoting 
Western European nation states. According to him, Western Europe fostered a 
uniquely market and innovation friendly environment were incentives for self-
improvement were in place. 
This is a fairly uncontroversial notion; more controversial however are his 
views on the role of the state. Landes adds a qualitative dimension to the role of 
the state. State intervention was not an inherently bad thing, rather the outcome 
depended on whether it promoted or discouraged initiative and business. The 
competing European states were striving for power. They also saw the link 
between power and wealth, prompting them to stimulate their economies by 
protecting their own industry while opening new markets abroad. 
Meanwhile, the uncontested despots of China did not adapt to a changing 
world until it was too late. Instead the Son of Heaven and his mandarins would 
continue a rent seeking behaviour. Trade was prohibited and manufacturing was 
shunned. Even worse, Landes complains, they shunned Western technology when 
it was presented to them (ibid., p. 392-397). 
By contrast we have Japan; the only nation outside Europe that Landes 
considers as being on the same page. He even goes as far as to see the island 
nation as a candidate for independent industrialization (ibid., p. 432). He attributes 
Japan’s positive development to the interest in Western science and enterprise, in 
other words, Japan’s institutional settings (ibid., p. 418-421). 
Landes highlights many important aspects of European economic 
development, especially when it comes to the role of the state. Very revealing 
examples of the marriage between state and business interests are the chartered 
monopoly companies. We must not forget that the British Empire, what the realist 
political scientist Robert Gilpin (1981) calls the greatest empire of all times, was 
largely built by private enterprises, like the Virginia and East India companies.  
And no one can deny that patent rights give rise to incentives to innovate, 
inventors like Watts became rich on these exclusive rights. A famous example of 
incentive is the £20.000 rewards for an instrument measuring longitudes, 
eventually collected by John Harris for his marine chronometer (Mokyr 1990, 
note 7, p. 69). But as with the Watt steam engine, a patent limits competition and 
thereby harms further innovativeness (Smil 1994). 
However Landes’s argumentation becomes somewhat hard to summarize. On 
one hand he stresses the importance of private initiative and a relatively free 
market, on the other he acknowledge the importance of state intervention and 
monopoly companies. His classification of a monolithic and stagnant China and 
the anarchy of Islam and India provide a very mixed message about the 
institutions that gave Europe a supposed edge. A “just right”-argument is 
unsatisfying as it renders little understanding and raises ever more questions. 
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Central to Pomeranz’s (2000) argumentation, that living standards in 18th 
century Europe and China were quite similar, is that institutional arrangements did 
not differ in a way that was decisive for their economies. He does not discrediting 
the importance of European institutions, but instead points to similar institutions 
or functioning substitutes, in China. Property rights existed there as well and land 
was easier to sell in China than in Europe (ibid., p. 72-73). Furthermore financial 
institutions filled their purpose well. They were small scale, but so were pre-
industrial requirement and they seem to have (ibid., p. 179-182). And capital 
ownership does not seem to have been more unequally distributed in China than 
in Europe (ibid., p. 136-137). 
The governments of imperial China provided physical infrastructure on a scale 
incomparable to any European contemporary. They also went out of their way to 
enforce competition. In some respect China more resembled an ideal free market 
than Europe did, e.g. few state monopolies or other privileges (ibid., p. 168-173). 
Trade by sea was prohibited, for ships more than two masts, but this 
legislation was poorly enforced and short lived (ibid., p. 170-172). And Chinese 
merchants continued to dominate the South East Asian waters for centuries. 
Instead of failing institutions, Pomeranz attributes the eventual divergence 
between Europe, i.e. England, and China to domestic and colonial natural 
resources. This has already been discussed in Chapter 2. 
The Indian economy and institutional setting offers a more complex picture. 
Not politically unified until 1946, there are few common historical pan-Indian 
institutions. Data on pre-industrial India is sparse as well, but the sources we have 
has to suffice for the purpose of this study. 
David Washbrook (2007) adds an interesting dimension to the debate about 
the Indian economy, by asking: What made the Indian exporting industry so 
successful, to the degree that European nations introduced vast protectionist 
measures, in the 16th and 17th century? This question contrasts to the mainstream 
research trying to explain India’s decline on the economic world stage. 
Washbrook first concludes that Indian goods where cheaper due to cheap 
inputs, rather than a labour force kept in destitution. He also notes that Indian 
manufactured goods had a quality dimension (ibid., p. 100). Indian cotton cloth 
held a much higher quality than European; it would take centuries before 
European manufactures could imitate Indian textiles. 
Quite controversially Washbrook attributes part of this superior quality to the 
caste structure of India (ibid., p. 101-102). Caste forbids anyone to freely seek 
employment, and this has generally been seen as leading to suboptimal 
allocations. But constrained within a profession the only mean of self-
improvement becomes specializing within that profession. And soon castes and 
the thousands of sub-castes found ever smaller niches in artisanal manufacturing. 
The landholding situation seems worse in pre-industrial India than in Europe 
or China. Landlessness was a common feature among the peasantry. But the view 
that these landless labourers were totally powerless might be exaggerated. The 
rural tenants and landless had some measures of defending themselves in the 
Mughal era, such as refusing to pay taxes, mass flight or even armed resistance 
(Habib 1984, p. 8-13). Though these were obsolete strategies in most of the world 
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by that time, and extremely risky, this nonetheless shows that Indian farmers were 
not as complacent and chanceless as once though. 
But 18th century India on a whole seems to have been more unequal than her 
contemporaries (Pomeranz 2000, p. 136). Luxury consumption was mainly 
confined to the upper strata of society. However, we know to little about the 
inequality in pre-industrial India to make any quantitative estimates on how much.  
Pre-industrial India was not at all deprived of other institutions deemed as 
vital for development. Both private business and portfolio capitalism flourished 
on the subcontinent. And in the Bengal the financial institution of the Jagath Seth 
wielded immense political power (ibid., p. 176). 
The historical account above has given some insights. Incentives for 
innovation and right to the profits of ones own labour is central when it comes to 
facilitating innovativeness and economic growth. The same can be said for good 
governance and state capacity building.  
Looking at the world of today it is clear that the quality of institutions matter. 
Let us, for instance, remember that institutional quality alone explains a solid 67 
per cent of the logarithm of GDP in the cross country analysis by Hibbs and 
Olsson (2004). But when it comes to the question of exactly what institutions are 
beneficial, we suddenly feel less confident (Rodrik 2003, p. 4-6). 
 
What does economic growth theory have to say about the causes of technologic 
development? After the importance of technology had been established by Solow, 
Paul Romer was among the leading researchers in developing the new growth 
model. Drawing on the microeconomic theories about imperfect competition, the 
Romer model endogenizes technological progress by the fact that inventors are 
interested in making a profit (ibid., p. 97). In this model growth will depend on 
the number of people in the research and development sector and their efficiency, 
as well as propensity to learn from previous research (ibid., p. 101-103). 
The Romer model has gained empirical support, but some components can be 
debated. For instance, the number employed in the research and development 
sector has grown steadily in the industrialized economies, but long term growth 
rates have continued to revolve around 2 per cent. 
And, as we have seen above, growth rate in patents and the overall economy 
do not correspond. My own thought on this development have been presented in 
section 2.3. And research and development prior to 1850 was not decisive and the 
relationship between science and technology up to that date is hard to grasp 
(Mokyr 1990, p. 167-169). 
But Romer also saw the ability to learn from others as crucial. In a further 
developed version of the Romer model, knowledge, learning and education was 
emphasized. Economic growth is just not a process of developing yourself, but 
also learning from others. Learning is what the Japanese did from the Americans 
and Europeans after World War II. And learning is what the medieval Europeans 
did from the Arabs and the Chinese. Openness to ideas is therefore rightly seen as 
central to the diffusion of technology (Jones 2002, p. 124-127). This openness is 
in turn linked to, and often measured as, openness to trade.  
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The notion that free market is beneficial for growth goes back to Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo in the 18th century. Free trade, competition and comparative 
advantages would lead to specialization and optimal resource allocation. The fall 
of the Soviet Union has given us continued confidence in a market were goods 
and services are traded freely, instead of provided according to quotas determined 
by the government. And when comparing import substituting Latin America with 
export-oriented East Asia, it seems that openness to trade makes all the difference 
(Gunnarsson & Rojas 2004). 
But for openness to translate into a learning process there needs to be some 
initial level of knowledge domestically. Education was important to all East Asian 
economies. But other forms of state intervention were also common. Japan and 
South Korea manipulated the market to favour large exporting companies. China 
experienced some of its growth even before opening up in the 1970’s, the same 
can be said about India that grew in the 1980’s. And when scrapping import 
substituting policy in the 1990’s, Latin American growth has picked up. But this 
is largely driven by primary commodities and the benefits for the South American 
manufacturing sector can be questioned (The Economist 2009, p. 17-19).  
And based on empirics we can not say that trade free from any state 
intervention is optimal for the national economy. Not only were the monopoly 
trading companies, established in the 16th century by many West European 
nations, vital to their colonial expansion. But the newly established German state 
in the 19th century played a key role in the construction of its economy (Landes 
1998, Cameron & Neal 2003). 
Landes (1998) arguments that state intervention may be benign, this may be 
controversial to those economic historians specialized on Western economic 
history. But for students of the East Asian economies this is anything but a 
surprise. Japan was the first non-European nation to industrialize and the state 
held a key role in promoting industrial development. Since then, all of the so 
called Asian tigers have had strong influxes of state intervention (Stiglitz & 
Yusuf, eds. 2001). The latest, and largest, addition to the Asian miracle economies 
is China, were despite some market reform, the state still plays an immense role 
(e.g. Naughton 2007), something many Western scholars fail to appreciate. 
But from all these examples we should hesitate to draw the conclusion that 
state intervention per se is beneficial. Policymakers make mistakes as easily as 
businesspeople, and corruption and entrenched interests of the elite often lead to 
suboptimal choices. 
Property rights are seen as the most convincingly beneficial of institutions 
(North & Thomas 1977, Landes 1998). Looking at the Soviet Union, or modern 
day North Korea, it is evident that people loose interest in promoting productivity 
if they in no way benefit from their efforts. 
However, again turning to pre-industrial China, property rights are not 
sufficient for long term economic development. A more recent example of this is 
Latin America. In the early 20th century South America was seen as promising 
region, but stagnated from the middle of the century (Gunnarson & Rojas 2004). 
And despite being most in line with the recommendations of the neoliberal 
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Washington consensus in the 1990’s, this did by no means help the continent 
towards a higher growth path (Rodrik 2003, p. 6). 
Even if formal property rights are not necessary or sufficient for growth and 
development, it is clear that some form of incentive is needed. One example of 
incentive structure is the Household Responsibility System in China during the 
1970’s which enabled farmers to manage their own land (Naughton 2007, p. 241-
242), and even sell part of their produce. This created incentives for improvement. 
Later Township and Village Enterprises were introduced, where small scale 
business was promoted, with the same results (ibid., p. 271-275). But this was a 
far cry from formal property rights in the conventional sense (Rodrik 2003, p. 8), 
not until today is the Chinese government contemplating to let farmers “sell their 
land”, officially owned by and rented from the state. 
 
Dani Rodrik (2003) stresses that it is extremely difficult to isolate any specific set 
of institutions that leads to the fulfilment of economic growth. Neither has this 
study been able to pinpoint any specific institution that has determined a high 
growth path, but we can still, quite straight forward, define the universal 
principles that benefit growth. And we thereby can also specify what properties 
we want beneficial institutions to have. 
From the account above we can conclude, that we want institutions which 
create some form of incentive. This often through some rudimentary form of right 
to the profit of ones labour and some rudimentary form of rule of law (ibid., Table 
6). Moreover, which has not been discussed much in this thesis, but is nonetheless 
important, we have to have some degree of macroeconomic stability (ibid., Table 
7). A propensity to learn from others is also clearly beneficial. But how these 
institutional properties are achieved can vary enormously between nations. 
Although we can take some comfort in that the main point of Rodrik’s paper 
(ibid.), is to show that neo-classical growth theory can actually be quite more 
flexible than some give it credit to be. From our discussion so far we must hope 
that neo-classical growth theory can live up to such attributed flexibility. 
If we were to continue by avoiding discussion of specific beneficial 
institutions and instead focusing on the beneficial properties they might render, 
we still would have to recognize that many of those economically beneficial 
properties have been achieved against the interest of entrenched elites. What then 
has caused, or forced, policy makers to promote them? This question is central to 
our understanding of institutions, innovativeness and economic growth. When 
closer examined it actually asks: What has caused the creation of institutional 
settings that has promoted economic growth? 
One very simple, albeit unorthodox, explanation might be; that some people 
are more rational than others, perhaps not so much by birth as by social context. 
This line of thought exists in the works of Max Weber, David Landes, and many, 
many others.  
I would like to state, once and for all, that to the question whether rationality 
comes with place of birth or culture, the answer is: No! Not because of any 
ideological conviction on my behalf, but because historical evidence pushes in 
another direction. The very nature of rationality is conditional. And what makes 
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perfect political and economic sense in one society can make absolutely no sense 
for the other. Likewise, mismanagement, entrenched interests and corruption or 
other factors that interferes with rational acting are worldwide phenomena. 
Economic and political rationality is better seen as an effect of development than 
a cause. In this sense rationality is just another institution that needs to be 
explained. 
But perhaps other properties may be inherited by cultural setting. Let us 
briefly examine the role of culture. Cultural properties have been forwarded as the 
explanation to industriousness and economic growth, spearheaded by Max Weber. 
He sees the Calvinist work ethic as crucial to the economic development of the 
Netherlands and Switzerland (Landes 1998, p. 210-215). And in the case of 
Calvinists this has undoubtedly been the case. Similarly culture, in the form of the 
Protestant-Catholic divide, has been forwarded as an explanation to the stagnation 
of Latin America and the difference between Northern and Southern Europe. 
But the economic relationships change over time. Just as early modern 
Calvinists in Holland or Switzerland were poor, but hardworking and increasingly 
rich in their days, so are the Confucians, like in China of ours. And culture can 
also change or be adapted over time. Japan is an excellent example of where some 
parts of the institutional arrangements have changed to better fit the international 
economy, while other factors have remained intact (e.g. Landes 1998). Culture 
makes an important contribution to economic development, but this is a far cry 
from ascribing culture any overall explanatory properties. Just as with rationality 
culture constitutes an institutional arrangement that need to be explained. 
This explanation is not easy to find an answer to in contemporary literature, 
due to the fact that the question has not been examined in detail. This may seem 
surprising as institutions have been given such an enormous explanatory value. 
However the father of economic institutionalism Douglass North does not 
disappoint in this regard. His answer is very straight forward (North 1993, p. 75): 
“[C]ompetition is key to institutional change…”. And when examining other 
authors within the field of economic history it appears to be a wide consensus 
around competition as the driving force behind institutional development (e.g. 
Mokyr 1990, Diamond 1997, Landes 1998). 
And Charles Jones, as representative of economic growth theory seems to 
share the above stated view (Jones 2002, p. 149), by quoting Mokyr (1990). How 
competition has shaped institutional arrangements will be presented and examined 
in the following chapter. 
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4 Contextual Dynamism 
In what way has competition affected the quality of institutions? The argument 
goes that competing states fostered competing markets, entrenched property rights 
and business promoting state intervention. Even those researchers who do not 
explicitly focus on institutions, e.g. Diamond (1997), ascribe explanatory 
properties of economic development to competing states. As a consequence 
Europe, with its constantly feuding nation states, was alone in fostering the 
modern institutions. 
The logic behind this is that the power struggle led European states to promote 
institutions that furthered exploration and innovation (Mokyr 1990, p. 78-80); 
such as monopoly trading companies, patent systems and different forms of 
property rights. Furthermore, the continuous need for financial resources for 
warfare forced the states to turn to their commoners who in turn were granted 
more solid rights, creating the incentives discussed above. 
Mokyr (1990, p. 78-80) sees competition as vital for innovativeness. Diamond 
(1997, p. 430-432) also sees competition between European states as vital to their 
economic and military superiority. Implicitly or explicitly there is a large support 
for this line of thought concerning European military and economic dominance. 
But what can be said about the world outside Europe? 
In China there is some support for this argumentation as well, not in imperial 
China, but in its antiquity. We must remember that the Middle Kingdom was not 
always unified. Before the Qin dynasty, and a third of the time afterwards, China 
was divided into warring states. During these periods those competing states 
granted extensive rights to their citizens. This was later rolled back with the rise 
of the Qin dynasty and the first Chinese Empire (Tin-Bor-Hui 2001, p. 373-374). 
A school book example of the damaging effects of a centralized state is the 
travels of admiral Zheng He’s during the early Ming dynasty. With a vast fleet of 
enormous ships the Chinese expeditions criss-crossed the Indian Ocean between 
1405 and 1433 (Marks 2002, p. 65-69). But once travels fell out of imperial 
favour no more expeditions were sent, the shipbuilding industry collapsed and sea 
travel stagnated. By contrast, Europeans had no such imperial authority. Keep in 
mind that Christopher Columbus got five refusals before getting a final 
endorsement from the Catholic majesties of Spain (Diamond 1997, p. 429). The 
Chinese maritime initiative was destroyed by only one refusal. 
During later imperial history, the Ming and Qing dynasty, China was and 
remained unified and unchallenged (Mokyr 1990, p. 231). The Chinese imperial 
state seldom had any fiscal deficits and therefore little dependence on bankers and 
merchants (Pomeranz 2000, p. 173). Some would state this independence as the 
reason why merchant had a lower status in China than in Europe. And it has been 
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suggested that it was this low status that hampered China’s economic and 
technological development (Mokyr 1990, p. 230). 
From the 15th to the 17th century Japan was engulfed in civil war, where 
competing Daimyo-states fought each other fiercely. To fill their ranks the 
daimyos used commoner recruits, called the ashigaru, mostly armed with 
muskets.  In 1600 the island nation, unified under the Tokugawa Shogunate, 
wielded more muskets than any other nation on the globe (Diamond 1997, p. 260). 
But once unified by the Shogunate, Japanese samurai started seeing muskets more 
as a danger to their own supremacy, not as a potential mean for conquest. As a 
consequence musket production stagnated. Although muskets were officially 
banned in the mid-17th century, it has been argued that the lessons learnt from 
their manufacturing served Japanese production well during the Meiji restoration 
(Landes 1998, p. 412). 
All the above examples from China and Japan, and almost every aspect of 
European economic history, seem to point in the same direction: Competition did 
matter for the creation of institutions beneficial for technological development and 
economic growth. The Asian nations benefitted as long as there was competition, 
but stagnated when they were, or thought they were, unthreatened. 
 
But when examined closer these widely accepted, and theoretically appealing, 
arguments do not add up with historical realities. Competition thrived in the 
Chinese domestic market during imperial times as well; the state ran few 
monopolies that disrupted private business (Pomeranz 2000, p. 171-173). If logic 
was true, that competing states foster innovativeness, it also seems odd that the 
Chinese inventiveness peaked either during the Han (Smil 1994, p. 61) or the 
Song dynasties (Mokyr 1990, p. 209-218). This despite the fact that China during 
there periods was a unitary political entity, at least during the Song. 
Also, the view of a negative effect by the low status of merchant during the 
Ming and Qing eras has been refuted lately. Merchants actually seem to have 
gained some societal status during those times (ibid., p. 231). 
And Japan does not seem stagnant during the Tokugawa Shogunate. On the 
contrary its GDP per capita has been estimated to have grown during that period 
(Maddison 2001, p. 253-254). And the government of the Shogunate and Japanese 
society was more acceptant of European technology than we previously might 
have thought (Landes 1998, p. 404-406). 
In contrast to imperial China, but like pre-industrial Europe, India consisted of 
competing states. Yet none of these did render institutions or institutional 
properties beneficial for economic growth. And none of these states succeeded in 
creating a sense of nationhood. Even the Hindu Marathas under Shivaji Bonsle 
did not achieve, or even attempt, a sense of nationhood. Instead the Marathas 
power relied on mass armies led by landlords (Habib 1984, p. 24-25), primarily 
from their own caste. 
And even examples from Europe itself disprove the logic that the amount of 
competition determines institutional outcomes. Let us ask: Where would we 
expect the most development among militarily competing states? The answer 
would of course be: In military technology. But when examining the pace of 
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change in pre-industrial European armament the sluggishness is striking (Smil 
1994, p. 184).  During the 100 years between 1500 and 1650 armies were 
dominated by the pike and shot formations. Pikes were slowly substituted for 
muskets as the latter improved. And from the 18th century up until the American 
Civil War between 1851 and 1856, the musket and twelve pound cannons 
remained the main weaponry. 
However, there is no doubt that superior muskets and infantry tactics gave 
Europeans an advantage towards non-European nations. Those who opposed 
seldom measured up. How could they, as they either depended on European 
armament and military knowledge or ignored it? 
We can now see that pinpointing the degree of competition seen as beneficial 
is extremely difficult. Landes’s (1998, p. 505) categorization of China as 
ecumenical and India and Islam as chaotic highlights this difficulty. 
Our historical observations have not made us wiser. The Chinese hegemon 
had traders and manufacturers operating closer to perfect competition than those 
in Europe, and China had economically beneficial institutions, but technological 
development still stagnated. Japan went from decentralized to centralized, but 
experienced at least some improvements. And the competing Indian states did not 
render improved institutional arrangements. Europe itself consisted of competing 
nation states with, to various degrees, imperfect markets. 
But maybe this is an interesting hypothesis: That it was not competition per se, 
but imperfect competition that led Europe into developing institutions that 
fostered innovation?  
The importance of imperfect competition in economic theory is nothing new 
and was applied within economic growth theory by Paul Romer. It was first 
brought to attention by Joseph Schumpeter in 1942 in his Capitalism, Socialism, 
and Democracy (Pepall, Richards and Norman, 2008, p. 573). He believed that 
the larger the firm was, the more would it invest in research. Let us here, for a 
brief moment, turn to microeconomic theory. 
There is a formula that estimates the share of sales that will be diverted to 
research and development by an individual firm (ibid., equation 22.8, p. 585). 
Without describing the technicalities of the market concentration formula, it states 
that the propensity to conduct research and development increases with the firm’s 
market share. There is also some empirical support for the hypothesis that 
imperfect competition fosters incentives for innovation (ibid., p. 585-586).  
The logic behind this is that imperfect competition gives incentives as it 
enables long term profits for an entrepreneur, as well as an innovator. But at the 
same time there is a major flaw in the microeconomic reasoning. 
What incentives does a monopoly have to improve its products? Compare with 
the strong market position in the early 20th century car manufacturing of Ford, as 
they announced that they offered only black cars to their costumers (Landes 1998, 
p. 548). And the Watt’s steam engine patent, issued in 1769 actually made 
technological progress significantly slower, up until 1800 (Smil 1994, p. 161-
164). If you are sole actor on any market, why offer improvements? And although 
the imperfect competition hypothesis has a lot of merit, it perhaps has more so 
during the industrial era and in the future than in the past. 
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Despite these doubts we can conclude that if any competition really did matter 
for institutional and technological development – it is imperfect competition. But 
this does not make us any wiser, as market imperfections are everywhere. 
 
Outside of Europe competing states did not foster a sense of belonging or the 
same institutional and technological development. India did not reap the same 
institutional benefits of having states competing for power. At the same time 
China seemed to have fostered market competition and other economically sound 
institutions, but did not reap the benefits in terms of sustained growth. 
To understand the development of institutions I would like to suggest a more 
qualitative approach to competition. I call this contextual dynamism. We should 
stop trying to define the world as competing versus non-competing. Every nation, 
organization, or individual for that matter, faces some sort of competition. Instead 
we should look at what kind of competition that faces the society we are trying to 
understand. 
It is not true that the late imperial Chinese dynasties were uncontested. The 
Ming faced a constant threat from the Mongols, prompting them to build the Great 
Wall. This was only finally solved by the Qing, who were Manchus, and made 
heavy use of cavalry just like the Mongols. 
The Qing dynasty was expansionary and had to face the Central Asian nations. 
The vast expanses of Central Asia were best dominated by swift cavalry, light 
infantry and light artillery. And this was exactly the composition of the Qing 
army. The threat from the European appeared less acute. After a series of defeats 
during the mid-19th century, China attempted to answer in the early 20th century, 
but then their Japanese enemies were already way ahead. 
The Indian states had a whole other set of enemies, mostly other Indian states 
with similar technology and tactics. When they were in need of advanced 
European equipment it was often less expensive and more beneficial to buy the 
gunners with the guns. But facing enemies on almost every flank the Indian states 
became a cacophony of different military technologies. In the third battle of 
Panipat in 1761, the Marathas used war elephants and bowmen alongside 
European style infantry and bought French smoothbore artillery. 
These state-military parallels are far from perfect in understanding economic 
behaviour, but also firms have to work and compete within a special national and 
cultural context. The Japanese keiretsu or the Korean chaebols compete on 
different terms than those facing American or European firms. 
The contextual dynamism, or the form of competition, that a society faces is 
affected by exogenous factors, such as a society’s geographic and strategic 
position. The institutional path chosen by, or forced upon, any nation will depend 
on what the neighbouring societies look like. The institutional path can also shift 
through epic events, like the bubonic plague in 14th century Eurasia or the small 
poxes in 15th century America, or rapid climate change. But contextual dynamism 
also leaves room for the internal dynamics of a society. 
With the concept of contextual dynamism, I do not want to deny that 
competing states were important for the European institutional and technological 
development. Patents and trade monopolies were created to enhance the national 
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wealth and thereby the capabilities to wage war. The financing of constant 
warfare sparked demands by commoners for improved political status and more 
advanced property rights. But through the approach of contextual dynamism we 
can acknowledge those events as specifically European, without generalizing 
those conclusions to the rest of the world. 
My main point here is that; different forms of competition have rendered 
different forms of institutional settings. This is not nihilism or relativism; it is 
simply an appeal to economic historians to acquire more detailed knowledge 
about the world’s different civilizations before making swooping generalizations. 
Similarly economists must learn the details of any nation’s specific institutional 
setting before making policy recommendation. This can not, and should not, be 
too much to ask for. 
 
Figure 3: A Graphic Summary of the Thesis’s Arguments 
 
 
 
The figure above summarizes the conclusions of this study and highlights my 
own contributions to the contemporary fields of economic history and economic 
growth theory. 
Ultimately contextual dynamism, partly affected by exogenous factors, 
determines the institutional outcomes. Those institutions in turn determine the 
propensity to innovate and invest. Innovations and investment, in capital and 
infrastructure, determines our ability to utilize energy. Finally it is the ability to 
utilize the energy in our surrounding environment that determines long term 
economic growth. 
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5 Conclusion 
This thesis is a consequence of my unsatisfaction with contemporary economic 
history and economic growth theory to explain the high growth trajectory that we 
have experienced since the industrial revolution. I have argued that the neglect of 
energy has limited our understanding of this process. And while energy is not 
sufficient to explain the expansion in world economy and population, it is 
however absolutely necessary. Without the energy resources the world economy 
would have run into diminishing returns, no matter how many revolutionizing 
innovations we would have had or how good our institutions would have been. 
On the other hand, it is just as clear that energy resources alone would not 
have lifted world economy without the technology to utilize them. Only together 
were these two factors sufficient to explain the industrial revolution and growth 
take-off. Technology in turn is affected both by natural environment and previous 
technological achievements. 
But ultimately technology and innovativeness have their root causes in benign 
institutional arrangements. However, I have argued that the institutions seen as 
desirable do not always work and that indisputably beneficial institutions are hard 
to pinpoint. It is much easier to define what institutional properties we see as 
desirable, but how these have been achieved through time and space varies 
enormously. 
Variations in institutional outcomes are determined by competition. Although 
I have argued that competition in itself is not sufficient to explain the diverse 
institutional outcomes. Any form of competition must be seen in its right context. 
Only the through the concept of contextual dynamism can we understand the 
different institutional and economical paths of different societies and civilizations 
in the world. And without such an approach our ability to give adequate policy 
recommendations will also be limited. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Correlation between GDP and Energy Consumption for 
Individual Countries 
 
In the equation below lngdp represents the logarithm of Gross Domestic Product 
per capita, in chain prices, (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/) and lnenergy represents 
the logarithm of energy consumption in kg of oil equivalent per capita 
(www.worldbank.org). The method used is ordinary least squares. 
 
lngdp = c(1) + c(2) * lnenergy 
 
Rich Countries 
 
The U.S.: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 07/23/09   Time: 16:26   
Sample: 1960 2004   
Included observations: 45   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) -8.187044 2.609195 -3.137766 0.0031 
C(2) 2.041302 0.292529 6.978121 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.531050     Mean dependent var 10.01900 
Adjusted R-squared 0.520144     S.D. dependent var 0.294840 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.039764   
     
          
 
Correlation: U.S.: Energy and GDP 
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The U.K.: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 08/17/09   Time: 00:57   
Sample: 1960 2004   
Included observations: 45   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) -15.56648 2.869765 -5.424304 0.0000 
C(2) 3.081548 0.349896 8.807034 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.643342     Mean dependent var 9.706676 
Adjusted R-squared 0.635048     S.D. dependent var 0.278424 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.201867   
     
     
 
Correlation: U.K.: Energy and GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sweden: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 08/17/09   Time: 01:10   
Sample: 1960 2004   
Included observations: 45   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 1.632366 0.507498 3.216500 0.0025 
C(2) 0.964387 0.059816 16.12269 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.858058     Mean dependent var 9.811891 
Adjusted R-squared 0.854757     S.D. dependent var 0.229579 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.225960   
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Correlation: Sweden: Energy and GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries that have Become Richer 
 
Japan: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 07/23/09   Time: 16:34   
Sample: 1960 2004   
Included observations: 45   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 0.832159 0.249702 3.332603 0.0018 
C(2) 1.107726 0.031543 35.11850 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.966309     Mean dependent var 9.588491 
Adjusted R-squared 0.965526     S.D. dependent var 0.487999 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.128964   
     
     
 
Correlation: Japan: Energy and GDP 
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China: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 07/23/09   Time: 16:43   
Sample: 1971 2004   
Included observations: 34   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) -13.02264 0.947359 -13.74626 0.0000 
C(2) 3.098285 0.144396 21.45680 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.935011     Mean dependent var 7.291689 
Adjusted R-squared 0.932981     S.D. dependent var 0.761957 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.386045   
     
     
 
Correlation: China: Energy and GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Korea: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 08/17/09   Time: 01:15   
Sample: 1971 2004   
Included observations: 34   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 2.292102 0.069790 32.84307 0.0000 
C(2) 0.890481 0.009329 95.45279 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.996500     Mean dependent var 8.926321 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996391     S.D. dependent var 0.613583 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.663489   
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Correlation: South Korea: Energy and GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 08/17/09   Time: 01:20   
Sample: 1971 2003   
Included observations: 33   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 2.773736 0.149588 18.54248 0.0000 
C(2) 0.846528 0.021119 40.08422 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.981072     Mean dependent var 8.756080 
Adjusted R-squared 0.980461     S.D. dependent var 0.416573 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.123994   
     
     
 
Correlation: Malaysia: Energy and GDP 
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Poor Countries 
 
Nigeria: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 07/23/09   Time: 16:51   
Sample: 1971 2004   
Included observations: 34   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 14.91687 2.146857 6.948236 0.0000 
C(2) -1.204149 0.325636 -3.697835 0.0008 
     
     R-squared 0.299382     Mean dependent var 6.978320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.277488     S.D. dependent var 0.097631 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.620122   
     
     
 
Correlation: Nigeria: Energy and GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Congo: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 08/17/09   Time: 01:41   
Sample: 1971 2003   
Included observations: 33   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) -64.70588 4.982453 -12.98675 0.0000 
C(2) 12.48257 0.871056 14.33038 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.868844     Mean dependent var 6.693260 
Adjusted R-squared 0.864613     S.D. dependent var 0.473518 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.006998   
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Correlation: The Congo: Energy and GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zimbabwe: Energy and Gross Domestic Product 
 
Date: 08/17/09   Time: 01:56   
Sample: 1971 2003   
Included observations: 33   
LNGDP=C(1)+C(2)*LNENERGY   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 4.939154 1.308074 3.775898 0.0007 
C(2) 0.460625 0.192972 2.387006 0.0233 
     
     R-squared 0.155263     Mean dependent var 8.061301 
Adjusted R-squared 0.128013     S.D. dependent var 0.098462 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.876238   
     
     
 
Correlation: Zimbabwe: Energy and GDP 
6.60
6.65
6.70
6.75
6.80
6.85
6.90
6.95
7.7
7.8
7.9
8.0
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
LNENERGY LNGDP
  53 
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
LNGDP
LN
U
R
B
LNURB vs. LNGDP
Appendix 2 
 
Correlation between Urbanization and GDP 
 
Table 4: Cross Country Comparison: Urbanization and GDP 
 
Date: 07/23/09   Time: 15:45   
Included observations: 151   
LN_URB=C(1)+C(2)*LN_GDP  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 1.543948 0.186060 8.298115 0.0000 
C(2) 0.272273 0.021139 12.88041 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.526841     Mean dependent var 3.912459 
Adjusted R-squared 0.523666     S.D. dependent var 0.505094 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.886391   
     
     
 
Figure 2: Correlation: Urbanization and GDP: Cross Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While there is solid evidence for correlation between urbanization and GDP 
per capita in a cross country study, when we examine the same correlation for 
nations below the $2.000 per capita line we find virtually no correlation. 
No pre-industrial country reaches above the $2.000 per capita line. This 
highlights the problem I see with Maddison relying so heavily on data on 
urbanization ratios (e.g. Maddison 1997, 2001). 
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Table 4: Cross Country Comparison: Urbanization and GDP 
(below the $2.000-line) 
 
Date: 08/21/09   Time: 00:02   
Sample: 1 37    
Included observations: 37   
LNURB= C(1)+C(2)*LNGDP   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 2.581342 0.980790 2.631900 0.0125 
C(2) 0.116484 0.142147 0.819462 0.4181 
     
     R-squared 0.018825     Mean dependent var 3.382901 
Adjusted R-squared -0.009209     S.D. dependent var 0.435334 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.954323   
     
     
 
Figure 2: Correlation: Urbanization and GDP: Cross Country 
(below the $2.000-line) 
 
